

JPRS-TAC-86-022

7 March 1986

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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7 March 1986

**WORLDWIDE REPORT
ARMS CONTROL**

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET NAVAL JOURNAL ON SDI NAVIGATIONAL COMPONENTS

Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 7, Jul 85 pp 76-80

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Shinkov, doctor of technical sciences; Capt 1st Rank V. Pantyelev, candidate of military science; V. Mikhaylov, candidate of military science; Lt. A. Baydukov, under the rubric: "In Foreign Navies": "Star Wars' Navigation Components"]

[Text] With the launching of the world's first artificial earth satellite in October 1957, the Soviet Union began the peaceful assault on space in the name of scientific progress and for the good of all mankind. And this peaceful assault continues.

In the meantime, super-secret killer satellites and other military space system projects are being developed in the laboratories and factories of the leading U.S. military industries. The Pentagon is financing a program for the production of systems for strategic reconnaissance, for conducting military operations in space itself and for attacking surface targets from space.

The formation of the U.S. Armed Forces Joint Space Command, the President's decision to create a missile defense using space-based elements and new developments in the area of intelligence and space-based radio navigation equipment clearly show an increased tempo in "Star Wars" preparations.

The latest development directly concerning the problem of naval development requires more specific explanation.

In accordance with Navy directives, until 1964 the U.S. Navigation Satellite System "TRANSIT" was being developed for extremely precise, navigation support for nuclear missile submarines. It included three elements: navigation satellites, a ground control system and user equipment.

The "TRANSIT" satellites circle the earth in polar orbit at an altitude of about 1100 km with a period of 107 minutes. Every satellite has electronic equipment (a radio transmitter operating simultaneously on two frequencies--

*According to material from the foreign press.

approximately 150 and 400 MHz, a receiver, an antenna system and specialized electronic memory). The equipment onboard power supply is provided by a system of nickel-cadmium batteries with an output of about 30 watts. On the four "wings" there are solar panels which charge the storage batteries during the illuminated portion of the orbit. Transmission from the satellites are made in 120 second cycles. The transmission power is 1-1.5 watts.

The ground control system consists of four tracking stations, two data upload stations as well as the Naval Observatory which updates the time on the satellites and synchronizes it to a common time scale.

The user equipment consists of an antenna and feeder system; a receiver; a stable oscillator; a computer; information input-output, conversion and processing devices and a power supply. It provides for determination of location coordinates and calculation of a ship's course between observations and instantaneous calculated data (azimuth and distance from a given point on the course, distance covered, coordinates, course and speed of a shift and the next time available).

The average three-dimensional coordinate deviation determined for moving objects (ships) using the "TRANSIT" Navigation Satellite System, as reported in the American press, was 90-100 meters (with a margin of error of 0.7) with one fix and for stationary objects of 20-30 meters using several fixes.

Western military specialists felt that the system precision did not meet modern requirements. Its deficiencies were: capable of use only with slow moving objects (ships and boats); calculation in only two dimensions (longitude and latitude); long time interval between observations (from 30-120 minutes); the length of time required for a fix (4-16 minutes) and the necessity to precisely know the ship's speed vector and geocentric radius.

In 1973, the U.S. Defense Department decided to develop and create the new "NAVSTAR" navigation satellite system.

It was hoped that this system would help solve the problem of land, sea, air and low orbit navigation by providing location and speed determination at any time regardless of geographic factors and meteorological conditions. The average three-dimensional deviation determined by one fix, they felt, would be: for coordinates--about 10 meters and for speed--fractions of a meter per second.

The "NAVSTAR" navigation satellite system was given preference in the national development plan over all navigation systems.

For the purpose of creating a continuous global navigation field, the J.S. Department of Defense decided to deploy by 1987, 18 orbital satellites which will ensure that no fewer than 4 satellites will be visible from one point for 90 percent of the time. This is considered to be sufficient to determine the user location in all three dimensions.

*NAVSTAR--NAVigation System Using Time And Ranging

Phase 1 of program development which lasted from December 1973 until June 1979, was intended for concept validation, selection of the proposed receiver models, evaluation of deployment cost and verification of the capability to meet the requirements of the armed services. During this period eight satellites were built: four of them were put into orbit for the purpose of prototype equipment testing. At the beginning of Phase 2 in 1980, the fifth and sixth satellites were launched (the seventh was destroyed during a missile accident). At its conclusion (May 1984), three additional replenishment satellites were launched for the purpose of having a constellation of five operating satellites to provide for preliminary operational testing. There was simultaneous testing of user equipment: sea, air and land.

After the third phase of system development which immediately followed the second, it is intended that the full number of satellites proposed by the project be put into operational orbits; the user equipment will be completed and installed, and the system will be brought to operational readiness and will begin normal operation.

The NAVSTAR system also consists of three major elements: the space, control and user equipment segments (Fig. 1).




Figure 1

A--Space Segment; B--Control Segment; C--User Equipment Segment

1--remote monitor station; 2--ground antenna for uploading information;
3--master control station.

The space segment will be composed of satellites in six orbital planes (at an altitude of 20,183 km), spaced 60 longitude apart and at an inclination angle of 63°. In each of the six orbital planes, there will be three satellites equally spaced at 120° from each other. The selection of these orbital parameters, in the opinion of its creators, provides for a period equal to half of an astral day, that is, approximately 12 hours. The system construction characteristics given make it possible to observe each satellite from just one control station at least once a day. Thanks to this, in the opinion of the project designers, this will eliminate or reduce as much as possible the dependence of the system on stations located outside U.S. territory and increase its reliability.

The design orbit life for each satellite is 5 years. For power supply to its systems, there are two solar panels providing about 450 watts of power. Special sensors make it possible to use the panel surfaces with the greatest effect. During maximum power use and when in the earth's shadow, buffer nickel-cadmium batteries are used.

The satellites transmit continuous radio signals at frequencies of 1575.4 MHz and 1227.6 MHz using pseudo-random pulse train modulation. Two coded signals are formed using phase manipulation. One of them--the P (encrypted) signal makes it possible to make highly precise measurements in a three-dimensional coordinate system available to military users only; the other signals C/A (clear) make possible less precise navigation measurements. Each satellite's P code, which is changed at 2400 hours GMT each Saturday, prevents the unauthorized use of the system for precise determination of location and time. In addition, each satellite signal is additionally coded with the C/A code at a frequency of 1.023 MHz to make it easier to lock on the P code signals and also to make less precise measurements. The C/A code is available for all users to measure navigation parameters.

There are six stations in the ground control and monitoring segment. The main station is located at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. A monitor station and an upload station will also be located there. Three other monitor stations will be located at Andersen, Guam; Wahiawa, Hawaii and Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. Three backup monitoring stations are planned for Maine, the Seychelles Island, and the Panama Canal Zone.

Mobile master control stations and upload stations are to be used to improve the system survivability.

The ground control segment monitors the satellite system orbit by radio, forecasts satellite ephemeris, records this in the satellite's onboard memory, synchronizes the onboard time with the ground time, checks the satellite equipment condition and so forth.

The user equipment, inasmuch as it is intended for the use of sea-going, air, ground and space users, has deliberately been put into a separate segment; the realization of its system capabilities as a whole depend to a great degree on them.

The user equipment set consists of four main elements: antenna and feeder system, receiver, computer and input-output device (Fig. 2).




Figure 2

- (1) antenna
- (2) antenna amplifier
- (3) receiver and information processor module
- (4) onboard power system
- (5) output to support devices
- (6) control and display unit

All NAVSTAR users have been divided into seven types depending on military equipment type: A--bombers, B--fighters, C--surface ships, F--submarines, M--satellites, missiles and others. Four classes of receiving equipment have been projected with consideration of the special characteristics for each regarding precision and construction specifications.

It has been noted that with the bringing of NAVSTAR on-line approximately 27,000 users, about 1500 of them belonging to the U.S. Navy, will be able to use it. Dozens of experimental models are already being tested. The three-dimensional location of stationary objects has been established in the experiments with a precision (one "sigma") of 8-10 meters, and moving targets of 16-22 meters. The speed of a moving user has been determined with a precision of 0.12-0.8 meters per second. Overall, according to foreign press information, system tests show its relatively high capabilities.

Great attention has been given in the U.S. to the use of satellite equipment for correcting the "TRIDENT" submarine launched ballistic missile trajectory correction. It has already been proposed that signals from the NTS-2 experimental satellites be used during the test to set the "TRIDENT" ballistic missile trajectories. In this case the solution of the navigation problem in the first phase of NAVSTAR system development was done on the ground using information transmitted in the telemetry channel.

The American militarists together with their allies, while attempting to achieve superiority over the socialist countries in all areas of military instruction, are giving serious attention to the development of highly precise, long-range weapons as well as to systems to track and control them which are functionally combined with reconnaissance and target acquisition

systems into target acquisition and weapons delivery systems. By 1974, the foreign press had revealed the first information on the development in the U.S. of onboard missile equipment for receiving information from the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System for the purpose of determining movement parameters for correcting their trajectories. They intend to put this kind of equipment in tactical missiles as well. In the opinion of foreign specialists, NAVSTAR will make it possible to obtain high precision for control equipment on the different types of cruise missiles. Navigation will be accomplished by comparing the given target coordinates with the current missile coordinates. Although the solution of navigation problems onboard modern guided weapons is possible using information obtained from existing navigation systems ("Omega", "Loran", "Tacan" and so forth), the use of NAVSTAR is considered preferable due to its world-wide capability, jamming resistance and precision, its ability to work with onboard inertial missile guidance system and its relatively high survivability. Only such a navigation satellite system, it is suggested in the West, can provide flying cruise missiles with terrain relief tracking. Along with the compression of terrain maps, NAVSTAR allows the missile guidance problem to be solved with the help of a relatively simple onboard computer.

The receiving equipment for missiles has already been tested on an F-4 airplane guided from a military transport aircraft. A single-channel enciphered receiver has been developed for installation on board cruise missiles. The equipment, based on this, provides for guidance with an error of 5.2 meters. In the opinion of foreign specialists this precision is fully sufficient for weapons guidance.

Since NAVSTAR is a radio navigation system with its inherent deficiencies, its effective use in complicated high-jamming environments is being given great attention and the system characteristics which allow the evaluation of its jamming protection are being studied. It has been noted, in particular, that the "satellite-to-ground" radio channel, a sufficiently wideband signal (20.48 MHz) is being used which is produced on two independent frequencies. Therefore, the information reception is only possible with a correlating receiver which restores the code. In this case the jamming source, it is thought, must be sufficiently powerful to suppress the signals on both frequencies. In addition, the spatial selection of useful signals is provided by a highly directive antenna. The passive receipt of navigation signals makes it possible to strictly program the operation of onboard equipment. Special measures are also taken for increasing the jamming resistance of its own receivers. Primarily, this is a reduction in the bandpass (of 0.61 Hz) of the tracking tuned circuit. The problem of integrating the onboard missile inertial guidance system with the radio navigation system and their interoperation occupies a special place. Under intense jamming, information from the inertial guidance system is used to verify tracking from the satellite navigation signals. In this case a narrow bandpass for the tracking tuned circuit provides for elimination of a large part of the spectrum, and consequently, the jamming energy.

Thus, according to announcements by foreign specialists, the integrated use of the onboard missile inertial guidance system and the NAVSTAR system equipment

provide for acceptable characteristics for prospective systems of highly precise missile weapons.

By increasing the power of its nuclear missile weapons, increasing their precision and reducing their vulnerability, Pentagon strategists count on being able to use them without retaliation.

The Soviet Union is a decisive opponent in the struggle against any type of arms race, including space. But it is absolutely clear that counting on the possibility of using a path to military superiority through space is built on illusions.

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CSO: 5200/1358

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

GREATER FRENCH-GERMAN COOPERATION SEEN

Paris LE FIGARO in French 9 Jan 86 p 9

[Article by Pierre Darcourt: "Laser Weapons: Franco-German Cooperation; Rapprochement of Views Concerning SDI"]

[Text] "West German industrialists have decided to make public the direction in which their research in space defense technology was oriented. In France we prefer to keep such decisions secret." To sum it up, this was the statement made last Tuesday in Paris by Henri Martre, president and director general of Aerospatiale and former boss of the DGA, at a press conference during which he answered questions on the views held by his group concerning the Strategic Defense Initiative.

What was most noteworthy in the statements of the head of the first French company which could start a program ordered by the government was the very clear change in the tenor of his speech. In effect, just about 7 months ago, at the time of the latest air show at Le Bourget, the caution with which Henri Martre touched upon the SDI problem harshly clashed with the winning enthusiasm displayed by Jean-Luc Lagardere. As the first high-level French industrialist to indicate how interested he was in the "star wars" program, the Matra president-director general merely sketched out the rough outline of an industrial strategy which will be gradually adopted by the big European groups.

What we witnessed last Tuesday was a certain coordination of viewpoints, for the president-director general of Aerospatiale could certainly not ignore the decision jointly announced by West German and French foreign affairs and foreign relations ministers to the effect that their views concerning SDI had become closer to each other. Paris remains opposed to a government-to-government accord with Washington but French enterprises are individually free to make private agreements with the Americans.

Expanding Franco-German Cooperation

In addition to some "exchanges" which have taken place between the French and the Americans in this area, it is quite obviously the possibility of expanding Franco-German cooperation in the study of new terminal defense systems (low altitude and anti-missile short- and medium-range defense) on which attention is currently focused. Within the framework of research conducted by the Saint

Louis Franco-German Institute, the researchers of both countries have, for instance, already developed for quite sometime a powerful pulse laser which specialists consider the most advanced in Europe today.

Other programs, clearly more advanced, have been developed on both sides of the Rhine and whereas any study within the framework of the French Armel Project (code name for the Laser Weapons Operation) is a heavily guarded secret, the same does not apply to Germany.

For example, the MBB Company recently announced, both in the United States and at company headquarters in Ottoburn, in the FRG, that it was able to develop a anti-aircraft tank and with a high energy laser generating a one megawatt power. According to the MBB management, such a laser would be effective within an area of some 10 kilometers around the tank against any aircraft, helicopter or missile exposed to this ray for 1 second.

Dornier, another West German company, is also working on high energy lasers. In short, with companies such as Telefunken and Diehl, equally involved in such research programs, it seems as though the Who's Who of German industry has firmly become involved in the development of laser beam weapons. In recalling the development of views relative to this question, a high Aerospatiale official privately told us that "It is certain that this is a doubly crucial problem. Not only can we not ignore its consequences but it also risks to compete with systems pertaining to another "trade" area.

In clear terms, the technology of guided energy weapons could bring up again the question of the current supremacy of missiles.

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CSO: 5200/2605

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRENCH GENERAL ADVOCATES SDI PARTICIPATION

Paris LE JOURNAL DU PARLEMENT in French 11 Nov 85 p 2

[Interview with General Gallois: "Europe Needs a Space Shield"]

[Text] The SDI program formulated by Ronald Reagan is causing an upheaval in world strategy. According to General Gallois, Europe as well should acquire a space shield, which presumes full participation in the American defense initiative.

[Question] President Reagan's strategic defense initiative triggered in France another initiative, the Eureka project, which was discussed at the Hanover Summit Meeting. What do you think of this initiative?

[Answer] Actually, the American SDI and the Eureka project are not comparable. The SDI is a program one aspect of which is investing the equivalent of 200 billion francs in 3 years to study the techniques of a "space shield" in order to protect American territory from long-range Soviet missiles. The military aspect of the program, i.e., the actual development of this shield, will not be operational within the next 20 to 30 years. Conversely, the civilian and economic fallout of this program is more important. In the leading technological research sectors the state directly stimulates enterprises and laboratories through orders and investments. Otherwise, they would not venture in such project alone.

[Question] Is Eureka a project of a different kind?

[Answer] Not at all. Its purpose is civilian rather than military. Furthermore, here public fund financing is minor compared to private financing. The enterprises which will invest in leading technological projects, which are part of the Eureka program, will take into consideration short-term profitability factors. Long term technological benefits, therefore, will be lesser. This is quite paradoxical: Reagan, the liberal, mounts a state-inspired program, a planned program, for it is the American government which is financing it and is assuming the risks, whereas the French socialist government is patronizing a project which is definitely of a liberal and private nature.

[Question] Why did France refuse to participate in the SDI unlike other European countries?

[Answer] France has its own military policy of nuclear national and space defense. The reason for which it has rejected any participation in SDI is that it is actually opposed to the idea of the territories of the "big" two being invulnerable to a nuclear strike. In its case it would strengthen the status quo and would gravely threaten the efficiency of its own deterrence although the eventual technology of a space shield impenetrable to missiles is rather a matter of the distant future...

[Question] President Reagan has described the SDI space shield as a major factor in ending the arms race. What do you think?

[Answer] To the contrary, I think that the SDI will speed up the arms race. It is the eternal story of the shield and the sword. The Soviets will go to work and make a massive investment in the development of supermissiles which could pierce the shield. In turn, they will try to develop their own space shield, which will force the Americans to invent new types of missiles, and so on.

[Question] What about France? What could it do under these conditions?

[Answer] France will have to develop new missiles and use tighter ballistic trajectories to be able to pierce or go under the shield. Furthermore, facing the Soviet Union and considering the hypothesis that the territory of the latter would be well protected by a space shield, France should orient its strategy toward "taking as hostage" not the USSR but the forces of the Warsaw Pact in Europe.

[Question] Do you think that France could meet this challenge alone?

[Answer] I am not sure. That is why I believe that we should consider the equivalent of an SDI, of a space shield on a European scale. It is a paradox to note that the techniques of space protection with a laser, programmed to protect American territory, would be much better adapted to the smaller scale of the European countries. Such is the case of the high energy laser: deployed at a great height in the Alpine Mountains, almost at the center of the western part of Europe, above atmospheric dust, such lasers could have their beams relayed by low orbiting satellites 40 to 50 kilometers above the earth. The beams would then strike the enemy missiles threatening the central and western parts of Europe. To obtain the same results, the United States would be forced to have mirror satellites, considering the size of its area to be protected, orbiting at 2,000 to 3,000 kilometers above the earth, which does not stand to reason... In other words, the futuristic technology would be much more suitable for Europe.

[Question] Would France have the means to implement such a program?

[Answer] I keep asking myself.... I also keep asking myself whether, given such prospects, that we have been right to refuse totally to participate in the American project. We could have benefited from some technological

transfers which would have greatly facilitated our access to such a space shield. The FRG and Great Britain have accepted to participate. The FRG, which is prohibited from having nuclear armaments as per the 1954 agreements, could, conversely, have defensive weapons like such space shields and defense killer satellites . . .

[Question] And Japan?

[Answer] Japan as well has accepted to cooperate in the SDI project. It is possible that Japan has thus chosen to "skip the stage" of an offensive nuclear system and finally to acquire a military instrument ("defensive," naturally but then our own strike force is it not also "deterrent," i.e., defensive?) which would be consistent with its actual power and would provide it with the means to express it fully.

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CSO: 5200/2605

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

DUTCH LIBERAL PARTY ADVOCATES OPENNESS TO SDI

Amsterdam DE VOLSKRANT in Dutch 14 Jan 86 pp 1, 7

[Article by our correspondent Theo Klein: "VVD Working Group Sees Room for Star Wars. 'Business Can Profit'"]

[Text] The Hague--The VVD Working Group on SDI, which includes prominent members of the party, believes that the Netherlands government should be less reserved about plans for the American space shield, known as Star Wars. The Liberals are quite optimistic about the effect Star Wars, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), could have on the coupling of the U.S. and Western European security systems, the balance between East and West, and in reducing nuclear arsenals.

The cabinet should, the VVD'ers say, establish a special bureau to win SDI research contracts for Netherlands firms.

The confidential report, "Defense against Missiles," is intended as an internal party discussion paper. The Working Group, led by Dr. Dake, is made up of members of the VVD committees on foreign affairs and defense along with some other experts from the party. The paper has been circulating for several months now. The discussion within the VVD has led to some amendments in the paragraph on SDI in the party's draft electoral program.

These will come up for discussion this weekend when the VVD decides on the definitive version of its program. The Netherlands government decided last October not to cooperate itself in the SDI research. Netherlands firms that wish to be considered for research work are left free to do so, however. In general there is thought to be very little chance of Netherlands firms' winning orders.

The VVD Working Group regrets the cabinet's position. This reduces Netherlands influence on the Star Wars decision-making process after the research phase is completed, the VVD'ers say. The government ought, in close cooperation with business, to investigate how chances for Netherlands firms can be improved. Here the Working Group has in mind the establishment of a special SDI bureau in Washington.

"Such a policy of creating the preconditions for success would be in line with this government's goal of increasing high-grade exports," the report says. In these views the Working Group goes further than the VVD faction in the Second Chamber of Parliament, which basically accepted the government's position. The proposals for alterations in the SDI paragraph of the electoral program do not affect the research part of the program.

They are intended solely to adjust the party's position on the criteria that Star Wars must eventually fulfil (including: effectiveness, affordability, security for Europe). Thus it may well be added that SDI must not conflict with the ABM treaty. The cabinet formulated similar conditions last year pending the research results. The report points out that the Russians have already been working for much longer on an anti-missile system.

According to the VVD'ers there is no basis to the fear that the space shield will eliminate the deterrent effect of Soviet and American strategic nuclear weapons. There will always be a certain degree of mutual vulnerability, the report says. "The point then will be to arrive at a mix of defensive and offensive weapons systems."

As part of this process it would be possible to achieve an important reduction in the number of offensive weapons, according to the Working Group. Of importance to Western Europe is the extent to which SDI affects the coupling of the security systems of the United States and Western Europe. If it makes the American strategic nuclear weapons less vulnerable, the introduction of Star Wars can be seen strengthening that coupling, according to the VVD'ers.

The report assumes that it will be possible to use SDI against intermediate-range missiles like the SS-20 as well. Thus Western European research can be directed toward defending against short-range missiles (SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23) to supplement SDI. The Working Group argues that the missile shield should be constructed carefully.

Continuous consultation with the Soviet Union will be necessary to ensure that the balance is not disturbed while both sides are working on their new defensive systems. The VVD'ers themselves note here that this is an "optimistic" variant. If construction can be coordinated between East and West, the arsenals of offensive nuclear weapons can be reduced "massively," according to the report.

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CSO: 5200/2617

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

COMMENTATOR CALLS FOR SPECIFIC DUTCH RESPONSE ON SDI

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 3 Jan 86 p 7

[Article by A. C. A. Dake, director of Delta Kabel Holding and former Moscow correspondent for HET PAROOL: "West European Security Interests Are at Stake in East-West Talks: The Hague Must Give Concrete Form to Position on SDI"]

[Text] It is time for the Dutch government to give a more refined and concrete form to its position with respect to the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative. Last 4 October, the ministers of defense and of foreign affairs wrote a letter to the Second Chamber about SDI in which they refused to commit themselves. There would be little objection to research as such, the ministers said, but the results of such research were uncertain and would at least be a long time in the making. Consequently, a number of prior conditions were mentioned in case SDI research were to result in a--American--decision to introduce defense systems against strategic arms. Participation by the Dutch government in the research itself was rejected. Individual Dutch companies could, however, compete and apply for specific parts of the SDI research program. This then required a more detailed personnel agreement between the American and the Dutch government, but in The Hague it was deemed necessary, so to speak, to sleep on it.

One can certainly understand why the cabinet took a cautious, "reticent" position in that letter. At the time, the decision on the deployment of cruise missiles had yet to be made. SDI did not occupy a central position in public debate, and there was scarcely any need to introduce a new "issue" in the area of armaments. And yet, there is more than enough reason for the government to agree upon its position more clearly, and specifically to show more interest for the military, strategic and economic interests at stake for our country in SDI research.

The United States is tackling SDI research with a great amount of energy and drive, regardless of opposition by the Soviets or hesitation in Western Europe. The focus of that research addresses three questions:

Will a strategic defense system with modern, new technologies (lasers, high-frequency energy, sensors, fifth generation computers) work?

Is it payable (in terms of absolute amounts)?

Is it cost-effective (that is, is one "unit" of defensive strength cheaper than one "unit" of offensive strength that the adversary can commit)?

It has long since ceased to be a question of a completely "watertight" protection against incoming missiles as is in fact assumed. A defensive system consisting of seven layers (as is the case in the current working hypothesis of the SDI organization) with an average effectiveness of 60 percent (while 80 percent is now considered feasible) is capable of stopping 998 out of 1,000 missiles.

Contradictory

The official position of the Soviet Union is internally contradictory: strategic defense is bad because it does not work, and it is bad because it has a destabilizing effect. Of course, both cannot be right. In fact, however, Soviet military planners have great esteem for defensive weapons and measures. This includes "exotic" technologies such as laser guns and electron conductors, but also the missile defense system surrounding Moscow, which has been in place for years, the very extensive air defense system and the protection of industry and government. The cost of all this is estimated at \$18 to 20 billion a year.

Should SDI research--in, say, 5 years--determine that the three focal questions can be answered in the affirmative, then the question arises of whether the introduction of defensive weapons would have a destabilizing effect. Insofar it makes one's own long-range missiles less vulnerable--and this is true for both sides--it could be possible to speak of a stabilizing effect. Indeed, the fear of being taken by surprise by a "first strike" from the other side is removed. It is different if more comprehensive protection is realized, and one of the two superpowers finds itself facing a completely protected adversary without itself being that far along. It can be concluded from this that an all-embracing strategic defense would have to be introduced simultaneously on both sides.

For this reason, it is necessary that there continue to be permanent, institutionalized consultation between the East and the West, similar to what has taken place, with several interruptions, in Geneva in recent years. The Soviet leaders are certainly aware of the fact that the Soviet Union is behind the United States in the most essential new technologies. The feeling of insecurity resulting from this must be addressed in an open dialogue. Western Europe must make a considerable contribution to this consultation, because our fundamental security interests are also at stake.

The Netherlands

There is a second reason for Western Europe--including the Netherlands--to be actively involved in SDI research. There are specific security needs of the Western European NATO partners that are insufficiently or not at all covered by SDI research. At issue here is defense against short-range missiles such as the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23, and defense against the SS-20 middle-range missile. FRG Defense Minister Woerner has in this respect advocated what he

calls the European Defense Initiative. He is supported in this by VVD First Chamber caucus chairman Zoutendijk.

There is a third reason for pressuring The Hague towards more activity with respect to the SDI project. Dutch trade and industry do not have the opportunity to compete as long as no framework agreement between the United States and the Netherlands has been signed (or the existing one has been amended). Great Britain was the first to conclude this sort of "memorandum of understanding" with the United States. The Dutch government thinks that there is not as much enthusiasm among companies and institutions here. However, there is absolutely no evidence for this position. There are clearly sectors, such as aerospace (Fokker, Philips) or arms technology, including laser technology (TNO) that would have something to contribute. The same is true in the area of materials (Akzo, DSM) and sensors (Hollandse Signaal).

It is now clear that competition will be fierce and that the American defense establishment is not going to feel much like letting in foreign intruders. Nevertheless, the Dutch government could offer definite assistance by:

Making regular information on SDI research available to trade and industry (especially medium-sized and small companies);

Exerting influence on the process of awarding contracts by--perhaps in conjunction with trade and industry--expanding the technical staff of the embassy in Washington;

Making American industries more familiar with Dutch "offerings," whereby "subcontracting" need not have a deterrent effect;

Concluding agreements on the transfer of industrial property within the context of the above-mentioned framework agreement.

12271
CSO: 5200/2612

7 March 1986

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

GORBACHEV REPLIES TO NAGASAKI MAYOR'S ARMS QUERY

OWI20457 Tokyo KYODO in English 0451 GMT 12 Feb 86

[Text] Nagasaki, Feb. 12 KYODO -- Mayor Hitoshi Motoshima of Nagasaki Wednesday received a letter from Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in answer to his message against nuclear weapons conveyed to Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze when the minister visited Japan last month. The letter was handed to the mayor by Igor Sokolov, first secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo, who called on him at the Nagasaki municipal office here.

The letter said the governments and peoples of countries of the world would be able to and must create conditions to see the 21st century free from nuclear weapons on the earth. As an obstacle to this, Gorbachev's letter pointed to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), city officials said. The letter also said the Soviet Union is well aware of Japan's three-point nonnuclear principle not to make nuclear weapons, possess them or allow them into the country. It said the principle can serve as a model for other countries.

Motoshima told Sokolov that he appreciates Gorbachev's proposal to scrap nuclear weapons in three stages by the end of this century and that he hopes Gorbachev will tenaciously continue talks with the United States on nuclear disarmament, the city officials said.

CSO: 5260/043

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

LDP SUGGESTS PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN SDI

OW141119 Tokyo KYODO in English 1106 GMT 14 Feb 86

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 14 KYODO -- Masayuki Fujio, chairman of the Liberal-Democratic Party's Policy Affairs Research Council, has recommended to the government that Japan consider joining research on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) at private business level, party officials said Friday. Fujio met with Hiroaki Fujii, head of the North American Affairs Bureau at the Foreign Ministry, and suggested that Japan follow West Germany's approach to SDI research, according to the officials.

The West German Government has decided against directly contributing to the research, preferring to encourage private companies and research organizations to participate. Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe showed interest in the West German policy when he visited the country in January, and Fujio's recommendation showed the LDP's support for his view, the officials said.

Britain has announced plans to join SDI at government level and Italy has organized a delegation of technologists from governmental as well as private organizations to the United States.

Japan expects technologies to be developed in the five-billion-dollar project that will have non-military applications, according to the officials. Japan does not want to "miss the bus" for the most advanced technologies, the officials added.

The Japanese Government is expected to announce how it plans to contribute to SDI before the next summit of seven industrial democracies, scheduled for early May in Tokyo.

CSO: 5260/045

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

NAKASONE SPEAKS TO DIET COMMITTEE ON USSR VISIT, SDI

OW180443 Tokyo KYODO in English 0436 GMT 18 Feb 86

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 18 KYODO -- Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, in another positive indication that he wants to improve Japan-Soviet ties, said in the Diet Tuesday he is ready to visit Moscow for talks with Soviet leaders. "I will not hesitate (to visit the Soviet Union), if the situation moves ahead as desired by the people," Nakasone told a lower house committee meeting. "It is good that Japan and the Soviet Union can establish relations as friendly neighbors," he said in reference to the visit to Tokyo by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in January. Shevardnadze was the first Soviet foreign minister to come to Tokyo in a decade.

Nakasone suggested at the time that before he goes to Moscow Soviet party chief Mikhail Gorbachev should visit Tokyo, because Japanese prime ministers have held talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow previously. No Soviet party leaders have ever visited Tokyo. Nakasone has appeared more positive recently toward making a trip to the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe is set to visit Moscow later this year.

In the meeting, Nakasone also referred to U.S. President Ronald Reagan's "star wars" program and said Japan will decide whether or not it will take part in research on the antimissile system when its independent study has been completed. "I will not leave the matter undecided in an irresponsible manner," Nakasone added.

The United States has asked Japan and several other allies to participate in the research for the program, which is officially called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Nakasone earlier expressed his "understanding" of the controversial program, which is denounced by the Soviet Union as well as Japanese leftist parties as a scheme to expand the arms race into space. Britain and West Germany have decided to take part in the program.

CSO: 5260/046

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

NAKASONE CONCERNED OVER SDI 'NONNUCLEAR' NATURE

OW181219 Tokyo KYODO in English 1151 GMT 18 Feb 86

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 18 KYODO -- Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone said Tuesday Japan's major concern in deciding its position on the United States star wars program is whether the defense system is of a nonnuclear nature. But Nakasone did not dismiss the possibility of Japan taking part in the U.S. program, officially called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), even if nuclear weapons are to be included in the system. Japan has not announced whether it will participate in the research stage of SDI, although Washington has invited Tokyo to do so.

Political sources believe the Nakasone administration wants to make a decision on the matter before the Tokyo summit of seven industrial democracies to be held in early May. "The most important point in considering Japan's participation (in star wars) is whether or not it is a nonnuclear system for defense purposes," Nakasone said at a session of the House of Representatives Budget Committee.

The premier said Japan will make a decision after studying whether the system is nuclear in nature.

The Foreign Ministry has said that SDI would not be regarded as a nuclear weapon even if nuclear energy is used, and that Japan's technical cooperation could be offered in areas not associated with nuclear weapons.

Michio Watanabe, minister of international trade and industry, was asked by an opposition Diet member if Japan will agree to supply its military technology to non-American SDI participants -- including Britain and West Germany. Watanabe replied that the matter would be dealt with on a "case-by-case" basis in accordance with Japan's ban on arms exports.

Japan has an agreement with the U.S. on the supply of military technology, but not with any other country. Some industrial sectors are reportedly concerned about a possible unchecked outflow of Japanese advanced technology to third nations through the joint scheme.

CSO: 2560/044

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

NETHERLANDS COMMENTATOR ON NEED FOR NUCLEAR DEPTH CHARGES

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 11 Jan 86 p 8

[Commentary by Jules J. Vaessen, retired naval captain: "Execution of Nuclear Depth Charge Decision Should Be Suspended"]

[Text] Many people in the Netherlands think they can serve peace by taking steps toward unilateral disarmament. To a certain extent the government has distanced itself from this idea with the 1 November decision. But at the same time as the 48 cruise missiles are deployed in Woensdrecht in 1988, the Netherlands armed forces' current six nuclear tasks will be unilaterally reduced. Minister De Ruiter denies there is any connection, but of course there is one. The reduction in the number of nuclear tasks will aid the politicians who are wrestling with the difficulties presented by the cruise missiles. That political dimension was once again underlined by the prime minister in an interview with ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE on 21 December.

It is obvious that the civilians will have the last word, even and especially in defense questions. But that does not mean that military considerations should not be taken into consideration as well. Nonetheless, no military arguments have been cited in favor of doing away with the nuclear tasks of the Navy's Orion aircraft and the Air Force's F-16's. And it would be difficult to do so. In its comments NATO has correctly pointed out the absence of military reasons for the Netherlands decision. The ending of the Navy's nuclear task in particular raises questions.

The sea lanes between America and Europe are essential. If in wartime supplies of oil, reinforcements, and materiel to Europe are cut off, we will find ourselves in a nuclear war chillingly fast. In other words: protecting the sea lanes raises the nuclear weapons threshold in Europe.

The greatest threat to the Atlantic sea traffic is the Red fleet's submarine weapon. The nuclear depth charges are defensive weapons, primarily intended for use against the most modern Soviet submarines, the alpha class. These travel so fast and dive so deep that so far NATO has no other way to combat them.

Heaven forbid it should ever come to that, but if nuclear weapons are ever used, then use at sea will be far less disastrous and escalating than use on land. In the oceans only military targets will be attacked. There will be no long-lasting radioactivity. There will be no devastated regions and cities with hundreds of thousands of victims. All those horrors will accompany the nuclear tasks the government intends to keep.

If press reports are correct, the nuclear depth charges are kept in Scotland. The Netherlands thus does not need to worry about storing them; the British take care of that chore for us. If we give up that naval nuclear task, the English and the Americans will take it over. How does that reduce the role of nuclear

weapons? To be sure, the Netherlands will lose all say in the use of nuclear weapons in the NATO region outside Europe. Was that say not the very reason why PVDA wanted to retain one or more nuclear tasks?

From a military point of view giving up the nuclear depth charge is the wrong choice. We give up some credible deterrent. We no longer help raise the nuclear threshold in Europe. We lose our say on the use of nuclear weapons outside the SACEUR region. And all that for a task where others take care of storage and security. You would think this was the last nuclear task we should give up.

Reducing the role of nuclear weapons is a splendid goal. But we must not throw the baby out with the bath water. It is still not 1988, we can still reconsider. The best thing would be to maintain the Orion role just as it is. But in all probability the government is not eager to reopen the difficult nuclear debate. Nor does it have to. The second-best solution would be for us to leave matters as they are and just suspend the execution of the decision on the nuclear depth charges. Just as with two other nuclear tasks--the atomic demolition munitions and the Nike Hercules--we can wait until a conventional replacement is available. Such a gesture would do something to improve our battered prestige in NATO.

12593
CSO: 5200/2619

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR: U.S. NUCLEAR TESTS 'STUMBLING BLOCK'

LD1423120 Moscow World Service in English 2110 GMT 14 Feb 86

[Commentary by APN press agency's Spartak Beglov]

[Excerpts] The general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, has again said it's impermissible to delay a ban on all nuclear explosions. He said as much in messages to the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and to a group of Swedish antiwar organizations. Our commentary has been prepared by Spartak Beglov of the APN press Agency:

Let's scrutinize the existing situation once again. For 7 years the world has been literally one step distant from the simplest and at the same time, highly important move to curb the arms race; namely, a ban on all nuclear explosions, including underground explosions. In all these 17 years it has been impossible to do this through the fault of one side. A draft treaty was virtually finished at the end of 1979, but in 1980 the United States demanded suspending the talks, referring to political circumstances as an excuse. In 1982 it walked out altogether. Now, the United States carried out in Nevada half as many underground nuclear explosions in the first half of 1982 as in the whole of the previous year. This alone made it clear that the United States had walked out not on political grounds, but exclusively for military purposes. Since then the American position has remained unchanged. Washington has been unwilling to stop underground explosions and it does not want to join the unilateral moratorium that the Soviet Union set on these explosions on 6 August last year.

So, there's just one stumbling block in the way of stopping nuclear blasts. The United States keeps improving nuclear weapons. Over the months since the Soviet Union announced its unilateral moratorium the United States has carried out seven nuclear explosions underground, for instance to develop laser weapons for the "star wars" projects. This is why Washington does not want to stop underground nuclear explosions.

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CSO: 5200/1257

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

PRAVDA EDITORIAL ARTICLE URGES TOTAL CW BAN

PM111740 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Feb 86 First Edition p 4

[Editorial article: "For a Businesslike Approach. The Problem of Banning Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] The total elimination of chemical weapons -- a most dangerous and barbaric means of mass destruction -- by the end of the century is a component of the Soviet disarmament plan put forward in the 15 January statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

In terms of their casualty-producing effect, modern chemical weapons are comparable only with nuclear weapons. They are capable of killing huge masses of people, including civilians, and causing irreparable damage to the environment. Their use is fraught with long-term consequences, since certain toxins, by disrupting the genotype, pose a danger not only to the generation now alive, but to future generations.

The 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare outlawed the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Today this document, signed by more than 1000 nations, has become an integral part of international law. However, it did not prohibit the development [razrabotka], production, and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

In 1969 the Soviet Union, together with the other socialist countries, submitted a draft convention on the total prohibition and elimination of the aforementioned types of arms to the United Nations. But because of the stance of the United States and its closest allies, who refused to agree to prohibiting chemical weapons, only the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was agreed to. It was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force 3 years later.

Only the exclusion of chemical weapons from national arsenals can provide a total guarantee that they will not be used. There is plenty to exclude. For instance, the United States possesses a mighty arsenal of chemical weapons -- over 3 million shells, aerial bombs, bombs [miny], and mines [fugasy], which total about 150,000 tons of chemical munitions stored at dumps belonging to the United States and its NATO allies. According to scientists' estimates, this is enough to destroy all life on the planet many times over. However, Washington is preparing to add to the existing arsenal a new variety of chemical arms, binary weapons, which are planned to be deployed primarily on the territory of a number of West European states. As in the case of the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, a selfish calculation can be seen here: averting a possible retaliatory strike from U.S. territory by exposing the allies to it.

Our country is making efforts to ensure progress along the road to the total prohibition of chemical weapons. In 1972, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries submitted a draft convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons to the Geneva Disarmament Committee (now Conference) for consideration. In 1976, on the USSR's initiative, bilateral Soviet-U.S. talks began on this question. Considerable progress was made, including on the of verification [kontrol], but in 1980 the United States unilaterally broke them off.

At the same time, the United States took a position of creating artificial barriers in the path of the multilateral talks on banning chemical weapons that had started within the Disarmament Conference framework.

While our country proposed new solutions to unresolved questions, particularly in the document "Basic Provisions for the Development [razrabotka], Production, and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction" (1982) [title as published] and in a number of subsequent initiatives, the United States hardened its demands. It attempted, moreover, to undermine the accords already reached earlier at the talks. The calculation was as follows: Deadlock the talks, ascribe this to the USSR's unwillingness to agree on verification [kontrol], and start implementing the U.S.'s own \$10 billion program for chemical rearmament.

Washington failed, however, to bring the multilateral talks to a complete standstill. The demands of the peoples that the planet be freed from the threat of chemical death gathered such force that the U.S. Administration was not only unable to openly ignore them, but was actually forced to speak out in support of them. Nonetheless, it is through its fault that the talks are progressing with intolerable slowness.

Under these circumstances, the chemical disarmament proposals put forward in M.S. Gorbachev's statement are of exceptionally great importance.

In the statement, the principled Soviet stance in favor of the total elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their manufacture is aimed at achieving a solution as soon as possible and within a clearly defined timetable. Insofar as the participants in the talks have already agreed that chemical weapons and facilities for their production must be destroyed during the 10 years following the convention's entry into force (and, judging by the experience of previously concluded agreements, 2-3 years may pass between the time they are signed and the time they come into force), this means that the convention must be fully elaborated in the next 1-2 years.

The Soviet leader's statement offers opportunities for solving a number of the most complex problems which have arisen in the course of the talks.

The key task of the convention under preparation is to ensure the complete elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles. The Soviet Union is prepared to embark on this soon after the convention enters into force -- as soon as the necessary technical preparations are concluded.

The Soviet Union proposes tackling another major problem also -- a package of measures to stop the operations of and eliminate installations for the production of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union is prepared to ensure that production of these weapons is stopped and formulation of procedures for destroying the corresponding production base begins.

One of the questions on which serious differences emerged between the participants in the talks was the timetable for the announcement of the location of enterprises producing chemical weapons. This is needed, in particular, in order to verify [kontrol] the nonfunctioning and subsequent elimination of the installations. The statement notes the USSR's readiness to ensure the timely implementation of this measure. Specific timetables for the announcement could be agreed on at the Geneva conference; it must be a question of sensible timetables that are justified from the technical viewpoint.

The statement particularly stresses the fact that the measures proposed by the Soviet Union for ending the production of chemical weapons and eliminating them and the industrial base for their manufacture must be implemented under strict control [kontrol], including international on-site inspections [proverki na mestakh].

The approach to resolving the questions of monitoring [kontrol] the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and the production, for authorized purposes, of the most dangerous category of chemicals, lethal supertoxins, has already been agreed on in principle.

However, the questions of monitoring [kontrol] the ending of chemical weapons production and the destruction of chemical weapons enterprises have not been resolved. U.S. representatives are speculating on this in particular. The Soviet proposals cut the ground out from under the idle arguments about Soviet reluctance to agree to effective inspection [proverka].

It is important to implement the opportunities opened up by M.S. Gorbachev's statement during specific, businesslike talks at the Disarmament Conference. The bilateral Soviet-U.S. consultations on chemical weapons that are being held in accordance with the decision adopted at the summit between the Soviet and U.S. leaders could also make a considerable contribution to achieving a multilateral accord.

While advancing the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons as the main task, the Soviet Union is also suggesting that several partial, intermediate steps be taken to lead to the same goal. The prevention of further chemical weapons proliferation would be of considerable benefit. The implementation of the proposals put forward in the statement for reaching a multilateral agreement on not transferring chemical weapons to anyone and on not deploying them on the territory of other states would make it possible to prevent that. The Soviet Union has always strictly adhered to these principles and urges others to display the same restraint. The USSR is prepared to hold consultations on the question of the nonproliferation of chemical weapons with all interested states.

With the other socialist countries, the Soviet Union is suggesting to the NATO countries that they agree on Europe's total liberation from chemical weapons. It supports the proposal of the GDR and the CSSR on the creation of a zone free from these weapons in central Europe and the proposal of Bulgaria and Romania on the creation of a similar zone in the Balkans.

The statute on the export from the Soviet Union of dual-purpose chemicals -- that is, chemicals which have a civilian function, but could be used for the production of chemical weapons -- approved by the Soviet Government in late January is in the mainstream of efforts for the nonproliferation of chemical weapons. The statute

stipulates that deliveries of these chemicals can be made only with the existence of guarantees from the importing countries that these chemicals will not be used directly or indirectly to produce chemical weapons. The statute is of a universal nature. It applies to deliveries to any countries and regions and does not infringe on the economic interests and requirements of the importing states.

For our country the prohibition of chemical weapons remains an important priority task. The socialist states have the right to expect and, in the political and moral sense, to demand from the NATO states a serious, businesslike approach toward this, one of the most important problems for mankind's destiny.

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CSO: 5200/1257

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR: U.S. ENVOY PRESENTS 'GARBLED LOGIC' ON CW BAN

LD141129 Moscow in English to North America 0001 GMT 14 Feb 86

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Breaking official silence on the Soviet disarmament plan advanced by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on 15th January, Donald Lowitz, the chief of the United States delegation in Geneva on Tuesday told the 40 nation disarmament conference that a comprehensive treaty on banning chemical weapons remained Washington's top priority. Here's some details:

At the same time, Mr Lowitz dismissed a series of interim measures leading to a comprehensive ban contained in the Soviet program, such as an agreement on a multi-lateral basis not to transfer chemical weapons to anyone and not to deploy them in the territories of other states. Here's a sample of logic provided by the chief of the United States delegation at the Geneva conference: It might seem easier to postpone resolution of the difficult issues, including verification, to a later time and to make progress on the less difficult matters, but such an approach would create a false impression -- that sufficient momentum has been generated to sweep all obstacles aside in the interests of concluding an agreement.

Well, we understand that Mr Lowitz and other officials who are dragging their feet on the Soviet plans would love to disarm tomorrow, to have no nuclear, chemical, or other weapons, but if this country proposed such a thing they would start chuckling about how unrealistic it is, that it's pie in the sky, and that disarmament, being a very serious matter, requires time and interim measures to facilitate progress, build trust, and so on. But when the Soviet Union proposes to speed up movement with the help of interim measures, it creates a false impression of progress and they're rejected.

The Soviet plan covers a period of 15 years, that is, by the year 2000, and is divided into three clearly defined stages. When United States officials say no to Soviet offers they wind up in a somewhat awkward situation because of their garbled logic. They tell us they want to build new weapons in order to get rid of them. When invited to get rid of arms, they cannot do so because they haven't built those weapons yet. They've just started a multibillion program of America's chemical rearmament. Its thrust is on a new generation of such weapons, known as binary nerve gas shells and bombs -- those things that Mr Lowitz would love to ban tomorrow without any interim measures.

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CSO: 5200/1257

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS: U.S. EVADING DISCUSSION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

LD131849 Moscow TASS in English 1821 GMT 13 Feb 86

[Text] Moscow, February 13 TASS -- By TASS news analyst Vladimir Matyash. The Washington administration, by resorting to invented pretexts, is evading a serious and concrete discussion of the Soviet proposals for eliminating along with nuclear weapons such barbaric means of mass annihilation as chemical weapons by the year 2000. As is known, it agreed at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva to give momentum to the talks on concluding an effective and verifiable international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on the destruction of their stockpiles.

One is surprised to know that U.S. State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb, asked about the American stance on the prohibition of chemical weapons, on February 12 actually rejected the Soviet proposals for concluding a treaty that would prevent their proliferation. The United States, he said, believes "that a chemical weapons non-proliferation agreement would not be an effective means to deal with the chemical weapons problem." Thus, the United States intends to pursue its dangerous and short-sighted course towards erecting artificial obstacles at the multilateral talks on banning chemical weapons that are being held within the framework of the conference on disarmament in Geneva. Moreover, it is seeking to undermine the early Soviet-American accords.

Official Washington apparently intends to lead the talks into an impasse and start the implementation of its 10 billion dollar programme of chemical rearmament. The United States already possesses a huge arsenal of chemical weapons -- more than three million shells, airbombs and mines which add to about 150,000 tons of chemical munitions stored in depots of the United States and its NATO allies.

According to scientists, this is enough to annihilate all living things on earth many times over. Washington, however, is about to add to the available arsenal a new variety of chemical weapons -- binary weapons that are slated for deployment first of all on the territory of several Western European countries.

Under these conditions, the chemical disarmament proposals, advanced in the January 15 statement by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev, are of exclusive importance. In the statement, the principled Soviet position in favour of the total elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production is oriented at resolving the problem within specific dates. This means that the convention should be worked out within the next 12-24 months. The key task of the convention is to ensure a total destruction of chemical stockpiles. The Soviet Union is prepared to start its shortly after the convention enters into force -- as soon as necessary technical preparations are completed.

The USSR also suggests handling another major problem -- a package of measures for preventing the functioning and for liquidating facilities which produce chemical weapons.

The Soviet statement lays particular emphasis on the following: The Soviet-proposed measures for ending the production of and eliminating chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production should be carried out under strict control, including international on-site inspections.

Preventing the further proliferation of chemical weapons would also contribute to the cause of peace. The Soviet position is such that a multilateral agreement should be reached to ban the transfer of chemical weapons to any other party and their deployment on the territory of other states.

The Soviet Union justly expects from the United States and its NATO allies a serious, businesslike approach to this, most vital, problem facing mankind.

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CSO: 5200/1257

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS: NATO ENDORSES CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESPITE INITIATIVE

LD181731 Moscow TASS in English 1721 GMT 18 Feb 86

[Text] Moscow, February 18 TASS -- TASS commentator Vasiliy Kharkov writes: The NATO leadership is going to endorse without discussion a U.S. plan to produce new kinds of chemical weapons.

Reporting this, REUTER news agency said American General Bernard Rogers, supreme allied commander in Europe, had included binary chemical munitions on the list of priority military needs for 1986 through 1992.

In order to avoid undesirable political consequences, suggestions on this score will be formulated in a special NATO document which will be submitted to the defense ministers of the countries grouped in this bloc when they get together next May.

Preparing to replenish American chemical arsenals with binary weapons, which are another, still more dangerous variety of chemical warfare agents, Washington intends to deploy them in the territories of its NATO allies. The plan is just as insidious as was the one to deploy American first-strike nuclear-missile weapons, namely Pershing-2's and cruise missiles, in Western Europe. West European countries are becoming not only nuclear-missile launch sites of the Pentagon but also storages of "quiet death," as chemical weapons are metaphorically called. It is easy to visualize the danger to these countries flowing from the American plans.

When U.S. Congress last December agreed to appropriate 124.5 million dollars to produce new kinds of chemical weapons, it made a reservation, stipulating that this kind of manufacture could be started only after obtaining the consent of the U.S. allies in NATO to the deployment of those weapons in their territories. Such consent is currently being prepared at the NATO headquarters.

Now that the latest Soviet proposals have touched off broad-based calls everywhere for ridding the earth of the threat of chemical death, the NATO binary weapons plans are especially ominous. The principled Soviet stand, which provides for completely eliminating chemical weapons and the industrial base for their manufacture, is aimed at accomplishing the task within the near future. The concrete measures proposed by the USSR should be carried out under strict control, including international on-site inspections.

The USSR supports the proposal by the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia for establishing in central Europe a zone free from chemical weapons and the proposal by Bulgaria for creating such a zone also in the Balkans.

The exceptional significance of the Soviet initiative explains the extremely broad response it has evoked in all continents. The problem of chemical weapons, which is one of the most important to the future of humanity, must be solved.

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CSO: 5200/1257

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR: BONN PRESSURED TO ACCEPT NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS

LD082213 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1745 GMT 8 Feb 86

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Georgiy Alekseyev with correspondent Viktor Glazunov from Bonn]

[Text] As is well known, the Soviet disarmament program takes account of such a mass destruction weapon as chemical weapons. The task is being set to eliminate them in this century, and this aspect most immediately relates to the European continent.

The stockpiles of chemical means of waging war are enormous there, and to judge by the Pentagon's plans, will be supplemented, and moreover, primarily with the latest chemical weapons, including binary missiles. We have Bonn on the line now; I turn to our correspondent Victor Glazunov. It is thought the U.S. military's plans have generated a most acute situation within the FRG. Is that not so?

[Glazunov] Yes, that's correct. The chemical weapons issue directly relates to the FRG. The FRG took on an obligation in the fifties not to produce and not to have atomic, chemical, or bacteriological weapons. The paradox of the situation, however, is that the FRG is the country with the largest concentration of both atomic and chemical weapons in NATO. It is true they are U.S. weapons, but they are on the territory of the FRG with the knowledge and consent of that country's government. The FRG is a key country within the Pentagon's military strategic conception, which envisages inflicting thrusts into the full depth of the enemy's defensive formations with a whole complex of nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons.

Experts believe that the whole of central Europe will be turned into a dead region in the event the chemical weapons stockpiled in the FRG are used. And now there is the question of binary weapons, and again the Americans are faced with the question of where to put them. Naturally the Pentagon has a scenario for both atomic and chemical war in Europe. Here the eyes of those in the Pentagon are again turned towards the FRG. They are, it is true, currently giving assurances, both over the ocean and on the Rhine, that the United States has no intention for the moment of siting binary missiles outside the United States. For the moment. And in this regard the following is curious and very significant: The Social Democrats have put a draft resolution before the Bundestag on preventing the siting of binary weapons on FRG territory. This draft was rejected by the government parties. Why, one asks? Because it already has been decided in the Pentagon where and when binary missiles should be put -- in the FRG, as close as possible to the defensive formations of the Warsaw Pact countries, as it is customary to say in the Pentagon's language. And in Bonn, they agree with this by all accounts. If not, then why decline proposals for preventing the siting of binary weapons on FRG territory?

[Alekseyev] Viktor Mikhailovich, as is well known, the GDR and Czechoslovak Governments recently proposed to the FRG Government that they begin talks on the creation of a chemical weapons-free zone in the center of Europe. What was Bonn officialdom's attitude to this?

[Glazunov] Well, Bonn officialdom took a negative attitude to this, on the pretext that they prefer a global settlement. Naturally a global settlement is good, but they in Bonn know where the key to a global settlement lies; namely, in Washington. It is Washington which has been sabotaging the conclusion of a convention on a total ban and elimination of chemical weapons for many years. Such an interim regional measure as the creation of a chemical-free zone in central Europe will be useful in these conditions. It will be simpler to implement it. This also will create favorable conditions for a global solution to the problem, and will remove the risk of chemical war in Europe. Bonn is clearly hiding behind the back of Washington. Clearly the Social Democrats, who speak of Bonn's vassal dependence on Washington, which does not allow Bonn to take a single independent step even if such a step is in the FRG's national interests, are correct.

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CSO: 5200/1257

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

BRIEFS

SOVIET, U.S. DELEGATES COMPLETE TALKS--Geneva, 10 Feb (TASS)--Delegations from the USSR and the United States to the Disarmament Conference have completed here a round of bilateral exchange of views held in line with the agreement between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan on accelerating efforts in order to conclude an effective and verifiable convention on a general and complete ban on chemical weapons and intensifying bilateral discussions at expert level on all aspects of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, including verification issues. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1127 GMT 10 Feb 86 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1257

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

GORBACHEV MESSAGE READ AT GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

LD201048 Moscow TASS in English 1039 GMT 20 Feb 86

[Text] Geneva, February 20 TASS -- Addressing the Geneva Disarmament Conference today, Georgiy Korniyenko, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, read the text of a message from Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the Disarmament Conference. The message reads:

"I send greetings to representatives of states who have gathered for a regular session of the Disarmament Conference.

The Soviet Union regards its participation in the Disarmament Conference with full responsibility as it understands that it is disarmament that constitutes the main path to asserting new and fair international structures and to building a safe world. It is disarmament that will release huge material and intellectual resources and make it possible to convert them to goals of construction, economic development and prosperity.

Mankind has reached a crucial point in its history and is faced with the choice of its further road: Either overcome the inertia of the past, when security was viewed primarily through the prism of positions of strength and military-technological solutions, or remain a hostage to the race with nuclear, chemical and, in the longer term some other, no less formidable weapons.

This choice between what is prompted by reason and what leads to catastrophe can be made only by all the states jointly regardless of their social systems and economic development levels."

It must be a bold and responsible choice and its being such depends to a large extent on the states represented at the Disarmament Conference. We can no longer limit ourselves to half-measures, which would only slow down the arms race in some areas while it would continue with a vengeance in others.

In other words, the time has come for us jointly to make big strides towards ridding the world of nuclear and other weapons so that security for everyone should mean security for all.

Taking guidance from these considerations, the Soviet Union put forward early this year a comprehensive plan, the centrepiece of which is a stage-by-stage programme of the elimination of nuclear weapons. We suggest that the Damoclean sword hanging over the peoples ever since the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki be removed once and for all before the end of this century.

It is only just that the Soviet Union and the United States, which have the largest nuclear potentials, should take the first decisive step to be followed by the other nuclear powers."

"It is our profound conviction that there is only one, direct way to rid mankind of the nuclear threat, and it is to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. Objective realities are such that the development and deployment of 'star wars' weapons is bound to spur . the arms race in every area. That is why it is necessary from the outset to put an effective international ban on space strike weapons.

The Soviet Union suggests that chemical weapons, too, should be completely eliminated by the end of this century and that the finalisation of a convention on this problem, unduly dragged out, be given a decisive impetus.

"Calling for a world without nuclear or chemical weapons, we are also prepared to go as far in reducing conventional armaments and armed forces as other states are prepared to go.

It should be stressed specifically that we suggest that all the practical measures to limit armaments and to achieve disarmament should be backed by measures of effective control and verification. The Soviet Union is as interested as any other state in being confident of strict compliance with accords.

Many provisions of our plan are directly related to the Disarmament Conference."

"Suffice it to say that the first item on its agenda is the problem of prohibiting tests, the radical solution of which, in our view, could turn the tide in the battle for the removal of the nuclear threat.

The Soviet Union for its part has been doing and continues to do everything possible to accomplish this goal. It agrees, inter alia, to the strictest verification of a nuclear weapon test ban, including on-site inspections and the use of every achievement of seismology.

As everyone knows, last year the USSR, wishing to set a good example, unilaterally halted all nuclear explosions, and then extended its moratorium to March 31, 1986. It now depends first and foremost on the United States whether the moratorium will continue beyond that date and whether it will become bilateral and subsequently multilateral.

It is to be hoped that the states participating in the conference raise their voices in favour of such a mode of actions and that the conference itself succeeds in starting businesslike talks which could lead to the complete termination of nuclear weapon tests by all, everywhere and for all times.

I wish the participants in the conference every success in accomplishing the responsible tasks facing them.

[signed] M. Gorbachev"

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CSO: 2500/1258

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR'S KORNIYENKO ADDRESSES CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

LD201742 Moscow TASS in English 1720 GMT 20 Feb 86

[Text] Geneva, February 20 TASS -- The Soviet leadership, without needlessly dramatizing the situation, at the same time judiciously assesses the period that we, all of us, are living through, as extremely important, as a turning point. Mankind should make a choice right now, on the threshold of the third millennium that will determine its fate, said First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR Georgiy Korniyenko, speaking today at the session of the Conference on Disarmament, which is under way here.

Today mankind has already the means capable of leading it to self-destruction. The Soviet people, however, are far from expressing the sentiments to the fact that the situation is irreparable, that nuclear war is fatally inevitable. We are sure that there is the real possibility of making a radical turn for the better in the development of the international situation, of preventing the outbreak of the arms race with its easily predictable consequences.

The Soviet State, he said, in its policies always -- both in the pre-war and post-war years -- gave preference to the ideas of collective security, based on the carefully verified balance of interests of all countries. However, in the past we dealt with the idea that ensuring collective security was the way of preference. While today, this is, in our profound conviction, the only possible way. In the nuclear age security of states, as M.S. Gorbachev pointed out, "is possible only as security for all".

Another basic element of the new approach to ensuring international security should be the understanding and recognition by all that this task can only be resolved by political and not by military and technological means. A search -- even a sincere one -- for military and technological means of ensuring security can bring about only the same endless escalation of the arms race with the fully predictable consequences.

Such is our philosophy of moving towards a safe world, which underlies the practical policies of the USSR in matters of stopping the arms race and achieving real disarmament, said G. Korniyenko.

The Soviet Union's expanded proposals on a broad range of those issues have been set forth in the statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev dated January 15 of this year, the main integral part of which is the programme for a stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world before the end of this century.

In determining the content of the practical measures, envisaged by the programme, in their distributing by stages and establishing interconnection between these measures, [as received] the Soviet Union was guided above all by the consideration that no damage should be inflicted upon anybody's security in any moment of implementation of the programme.

The inalienable part of the proposed programme is a ban on creation, tests and deployment of strike space weapons, the ban without which one cannot hope at all for a possibility of eliminating nuclear weapons. And this is prompted by the consideration of doing no damage to anybody's security, and, the more so, preventing military superiority of one of the sides.

Disclosing the arguments, which were cited in the West to justify the American SDI programme, the speaker said that the posing of the task of creating a space-based ABM system, irrespective of a stage of its realisation, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1972 treaty on limitation of ABM systems.

Speaking of the objective interrelation between the questions of strategic nuclear arms and space strike weapons, Georgiy Korniyenko emphasized that the Soviet nuclear disarmament programme is structured in such a way -- and this is yet another of its distinctive features -- that the nature of interrelation between its various components is different: While with regard to some of them no solutions are possible without simultaneously resolving other issues, certain measures can also be implemented independently.

Among major problems which can be discussed and resolved outside the framework of the general programme he mentioned the question of reduction of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in the European zone and the question of ending tests of nuclear weapons.

Speaking about the Conference on Disarmament in general, he said in conclusion, I would like to state very clearly that the Soviet leadership, as is confirmed by the message of Mikhail Gorbachev to the conference, views it as an important and, in a way, unique forum, where representatives of 40 nations -- large and small, socialist and capitalist, belonging to military alliances and non-aligned, located in various geographic regions of the world participate in the consideration and elaboration of decision on disarmament issues.

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CSO: 5200/1258

7 March 1986

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

TASS NOTES 'NEW' MBFR PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

Details of Proposal

LD201251 Moscow TASS in English 1246 GMT 20 Feb 86

[Text] Vienna, February 20 TASS -- A plenary meeting which was held today at talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe was addressed by Ambassador Andre Wieland, leader of the delegation from the German Democratic Republic.

The GDR delegation tabled a detailed draft agreement on the initial reduction by the Soviet Union and the United States of land forces and armaments with the subsequent freezing of the levels of armed forces and armaments by the sides on related measures in central Europe. The draft was tabled on behalf of the socialist countries that are taking a direct part in the Vienna negotiations, namely the GDR, Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

The NATO countries were invited to get down to working out a mutually acceptable agreement on the basis of this draft. While preserving all fundamental provisions of the socialist countries' proposal of February 14, 1985, the new draft develops, specifies and amplifies them in many ways.

It takes into account those elements in the Western negotiators' position, on a number of important aspects where the sides lack agreement. The basic provisions of the draft agreement are as follows:

-- Within one year after the agreement's entry into force the Soviet Union and the United States pull out respectively 11,500 and 6,500 servicemen of their land forces together with their organic armaments and combat hardware from the area of central Europe to within their national territories. The lists of the military units to be reduced and withdrawn are to be exchanged in advance, before the agreement is signed.

-- All the eleven direct participants in the talks undertake after the reduction of the Soviet and American forces is completed not to increase the numerical strength and armaments of their land forces and air forces in central Europe for three years.

-- After the no-increase commitment becomes effective, annually updated figures concerning the armed forces of the NATO countries and of the Warsaw Treaty countries remaining in the reduction zone will be exchanged.

-- For the period of the reduction of the forces of the USSR and the United States and the subsequent period, during which the no-increase (freeze) commitment is in effect, three or four permanent verification posts will be established each on the western and eastern sides of the reduction area. All formations, units and subunits of the land forces of the parties to the agreement will enter or leave the reduction area through these posts. The posts will be manned by representatives of both sides.

-- It is provided that the sides will give advance notification on a reciprocal basis of such military activities as troop movements, the callup of reservists, and military exercises involving 20,000 or more men.

-- Along with the use of national technical means of verification in order to ensure compliance with the agreement, the possibility of conducting on-site inspections on justified request is not ruled out.

-- It is also provided for setting up a consultative commission for a prompt examination of issues connected with the fulfilment of the agreement.

The representative of the GDR said that as they formulated the verification measures, the Warsaw Treaty countries proceeded from the task of reliably ensuring the fulfilment of the obligations to reduce and freeze armed forces in central Europe and the essential proportionality of these measures with the content and nature of the suggested agreement. They also gave consideration to the peculiarities of the present-day international situation which remains complicated and tense. The draft agreement tabled by the socialist countries represents a realistical basis for a possible accord in Vienna.

Lomeyko Announcement

LD201225 Moscow TASS in English 1214 GMT 20 Feb 86

[**"New Proposal by Socialist Countries in Vienna" -- TASS item identifier]**

[Text] Moscow, February 20 TASS -- Today socialist states -- direct negotiators at the Vienna talks on reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe -- came forward with a renewed draft "Agreement on an Initial Cutback in Land Forces and Armaments by the Soviet Union and the United States with a Subsequent Non-Increase in the Levels of the Armed Forces and Armaments of the Sides and on Related Measures in Central Europe."

Having announced this at a briefing for Soviet and foreign correspondents, Vladimir Lomeyko, head of the press department of the USSR Ministry for Foreign Affairs, emphasized that the Soviet Union and other Warsaw-Treaty countries attach much importance to the Vienna talks in the drive to strengthen European security. Such an agreement, as is pointed out in Mikhail Gorbachev's statement of January 15, this year, could become a signal for the start of headway towards a reduction in conventional arms and armed forces.

The new initiative of socialist countries develops and specifies the known February (1985) proposal of the Warsaw Treaty member states. It takes into consideration a number of elements of Western negotiators' positions set out in their reply considerations of December 5, last year.

The initiative of the Warsaw Treaty member states brings the stands of the sides substantially closer together, including those in the sphere of verification of the observance of the agreement. Pertaining to this are proposals on establishing three-four permanently functioning verification stations to monitor the entry of any military contingents into the cutback zone and their withdrawal from it throughout the entire period of the currency of the agreement; on instituting a consultative commission for the period of the currency of the agreement; a procedure for requests for carrying out on-site inspections; and finally exchanges of numerical data on the armed forces in the cutback area (their strength, movements and exercises) on the basis of reciprocity.

Agreement Possible

LD201420 Moscow TASS in English 1359 GMT 20 Feb 86

[Text] Moscow, February 20 TASS -- The Soviet side considers it possible to reach agreement in Vienna already this year. A basis for that is being furnished by the present proposals of socialist countries, Vladimir Lomeyko, head of the press department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists today.

However, this depends not only on the Soviet side. Mikhail Gorbachev's statement of January 15, this year, points out that 1986 could become a landmark for the talks in Geneva if the other side really strives for that.

Despite the modest amounts of cutbacks, the Foreign Ministry spokesman emphasized when answering journalists' questions, an initial agreement would be of considerable importance. It would get the talks moving after their being stalled for more than 12-odd years now and would raise their prestige in the eyes of the European public and, finally, would promote to a certain extent an improvement of the military- and political climate in Europe and not only in Europe.

"Initial cutbacks" in conjunction with non-increase in the levels of troops and armaments would contribute to creating a favourable atmosphere for moving on to larger cuts in the armed forces and armaments on the basis of reciprocity to equal collective ceilings at a lower level down to 900,000 men for each side, and those of land forces down to 700,000 men.

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CSO: 5200/1258

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: WEST'S MBFR PROPOSALS LACK 'REALISM,' 'RECIPROCITY'

PM201424 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Feb 86 First Edition p 5

[D. Nikolayev article under the rubric "Events and Opinions": "Moving From a Standstill"]

[Text] The large-scale peace initiatives advanced in the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, reveal a practical way of achieving progress at talks in all areas of disarmament. This, of course, also applies to the Vienna talks on reducing armed forces and armaments in central Europe.

The dialogue between the Warsaw Pact states and NATO countries has been under way now for more than 12 years. The reason for the standstill -- up to now no substantial results have been achieved -- lies in the NATO countries' unconstructive and unrealistic position and their claims for a so-called asymmetrical (significantly greater for Warsaw Pact countries than for NATO countries) reduction of troops. The groundlessness of these claims by the West was shown, in particular, during an exchange of numerical data. It showed that in central Europe there is an approximate balance in the correlation of NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces. Progress in Vienna is also hampered by the NATO countries' unwillingness to extend reduction and limitation to armaments. Finally, a serious obstacle is the artificially exaggerated claims of the West on verification [kontrol], which in no way corresponds to the scale and volume of measures for a practical reduction in the level of military confrontation. The sum total of this brought about the NATO countries' unwillingness to consider the socialist states' proposals in a businesslike and serious way.

Many such proposals have been submitted in Vienna. Take, for instance, the socialist countries' initiative on reducing, over 1 year, a certain proportion of Soviet and U.S. forces and their conventional arms and combat equipment, with a subsequent 2-year freeze on the level of forces and arms.

This initiative provided a real opportunity for concrete results in a practical reduction of the excessive concentration of arms in central Europe.

However, the NATO countries avoided a businesslike discussion of this constructive proposal for almost a whole year. Yet, in December, at the very end of the regular round, the West advanced their reciprocal views. The NATO representatives support initial reductions of Soviet and U.S. forces, although in lesser volumes and without taking arms into account.

The very fact of a response by the Western participants to the socialist countries' proposals can be assessed positively. But, at the same time it must be observed that the West's response contains elements that do not meet the requirements of realism and the principle of reciprocity and nondetriment to either side.

The latest round of talks in Geneva began 30 January under unusual conditions.

At the center of the participants' attention were the Soviet proposals advanced in the statement by M.S. Gorbachev. The Soviet side at the highest level again confirmed our country's principled position that, together with the removal of weapons of mass destruction from states' arsenals, conventional arms and armed forces should become a subject for agreed reductions.

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CSO: 5200/1258

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

BRIEFS

DRAFT TREATY SUBMITTED AT MBFR TALKS--Vienna, 20 Feb (TASS)--A detailed draft treaty on initial reduction by the Soviet Union and the USA of land forces and arms with subsequent non-increase in the levels of armed forces and arms by the sides and measures in this connection in central Europe has been tabled on behalf of the socialist countries at the plenary meeting today at the talks on mutual force and arms cuts in central Europe. The NATO countries have also been proposed to start drawing up on its basis a mutually acceptable text of agreement. Addressing the meeting, the head of the GDR delegation pointed out that the draft treaty tabled by the socialist countries is a realistic basis for reaching agreement in Vienna. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1005 GMT 20 Feb 86 LD] /9738

SOVIET MBFR NEGOTIATORS MEET FRG POLITICIANS--Vienna, 21 Feb (TASS)--The leaders of the delegations from socialist countries to Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe have met here with a group of members of the West German Bundestag's sub-commission on disarmament and arms control, which was led by sub-commission chairman Egon Bahr. Head of the Soviet delegation Valerian Mikhaylov was among those taking part in the meeting. The attention of the West German MP's was called to the importance of the draft basic provisions of an agreement on initial cuts by the Soviet Union and the United States in their land forces and armaments in central Europe and the subsequent freezing of the levels of armed forces and armaments there, which has been tabled at the talks by the socialist countries. It was stressed that seeking to provide a realistic and business-like basis for a mutually acceptable agreement in Vienna, the Warsaw Treaty states have incorporated a number of new and important elements in their negotiating position. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0945 GMT 21 Feb 86 LD] /9738

POLISH ENVOY CITED AT STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE--Stockholm, 10 Feb (TASS)--Ambassador W. Konarski, head of the Polish delegation, stressed, addressing the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe that the Soviet Union had put forward a concrete and comprehensive program for eliminating the threat of war and ending the arms race. The answers of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the questions of the newspaper L'HUMANITE, he pointed out, are evidence of the Soviet Union's firm intention to lead things to an

agreement on a realistic basis in all fields covering nuclear, outer space, chemical and conventional weapons, as well as confidence and security building measures. In his speech the Polish representative also set forth in a generalized form the stand of the socialist countries on inviting observers to major military exercises. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 2051 GMT 10 Feb 86 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1258

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

U.S. ATTITUDES ON SOVIET MORATORIUM EXAMINED BY USSR

U.S. 'Still Has Time'

PM271715 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 28 Jan 86 p 3

[International observer G. Dadyants article: "Why We Extended the Moratorium"]

[Text] Will mankind be freed from the threat of nuclear annihilation hanging over it?

Millions of people both in our country and abroad are now asking themselves this question. They welcome the Soviet Union's resolute new actions in defense of peace and the improvement of the entire international situation and see in every line of M.S. Gorbachev's statement an all-embracing program of struggle against nuclear weapons. This statement cannot be dismissed, as in the past, or declared "communist propaganda." Even Washington cannot make up its mind to do that.

President Reagan, commenting on M.S. Gorbachev's statement, said in effect that the world could be freed from nuclear weapons even earlier than the year 2000 -- the date proposed by the Soviet Union. What is the snag, then? The whole problem is that fine words in favor of peace and disarmament are rarely combined with practical deeds in the U.S. capital.

Take, for example, such an acute question as the ending of nuclear tests. Clearly, it is a key element in the whole package of Soviet proposals. After all, it is these very tests which are today directly aimed at whipping up the nuclear arms race, since it is during them that new and increasingly destructive and sophisticated systems for the mass annihilation of people are developed and commissioned. The question is, how can we talk about the destruction of nuclear weapons, if they continue to be improved and consequently, stockpiled even further?

The question today is this: If people really want to take practical steps to curtail the nuclear arms race, further explosions must be halted. The ending of nuclear tests would mark the beginning of the process of allowing nuclear arsenals to become objectively obsolete and ultimately, to disappear.

The moratorium on nuclear explosions announced by the Soviet Union last summer was a bold political move. It was bold primarily because the United States carried out a series of new nuclear tests that year and, at first glance, it would have been logical to respond to them with our own tests. But in politics boldness is not only

displayed in responding to an action with a counteraction. The stakes are very high now and the measure of responsibility resting on the Soviet Union and United States, in particular, is tremendous. We wanted to set the United States and the other Western powers an example of goodwill and a new approach to this most acute international problem.

Unfortunately, the U.S. side has not responded reciprocally to the Soviet Union.

After the announcement of the Soviet moratorium the United States continued to conduct more and more new nuclear explosions. The latest, carried out on the eve of the New Year, was directly designed to help in the implementation of the "star wars" program.

What position should the Soviet Union take under these conditions? If you follow the same old logic -- the logic of confrontation, then we should have resumed nuclear explosions from 1 January 1986, when the term of the unilateral moratorium imposed in August expired. "But the whole point is," M.S. Gorbachev stressed in his statement, "that it is precisely this so-called logic that must be resolutely broken."

Today it is not only questions of war and peace which depend on the resolution of questions connected with the nuclear disarmament program -- the future of human civilization, the life and death of whole continents and peoples are at stake. In both the Soviet Union and the United States scientists have come to the conclusion that mankind cannot survive a nuclear war. That is not a horror story, it is the horrifying reality.

The dramatic nature of the situation is exacerbated by the fact that in itself the process of military rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States could lead to a loss of control over the development of events. In the conditions of modern technology, nuclear weapons are capable of commencing operation by themselves, being subordinate not to human intelligence, but to an elementary computer error.

In deciding to extend the moratorium the Soviet Union was giving practical support to the movement for a general and complete end to nuclear tests, which is growing throughout the world. Today this movement has become a real force and a mighty support for the socialist countries' peace-loving policy.

To sum up, the purpose of the Soviet step is simple: to give the U.S. Government extra time to think and the opportunity to weigh not only our proposals on ending nuclear explosions, but the whole package of Soviet proposals concerning the elimination of nuclear weapons, of which the ending of tests is an important component.

Let us recall that at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva there was talk of restraint in the military sphere. Well, the extension of the moratorium is, if you like, a demonstration of restraint.

All the international reactions to the Soviet Union's extension of the moratorium indicate that we were not mistaken in our political and strategic analysis of the situation. The Soviet step was correctly understood by world public opinion. Swedish Prime Minister O. Palme, for instance, called the Soviet Union's decision "exceptionally important, since the ending of nuclear tests retards the further improvement of nuclear weapons," and expressed the hope that at the next Soviet-U.S. summit meeting it will be possible to reach agreement on a total ban on any tests. The London TIMES sees the USSR's initiative in connection with extending the moratorium as "a new goodwill step by Moscow."

At the same time the foreign press notes with alarm that the United States, which has hitherto rejected all appeals to join in the moratorium, has still not changed its position. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger stated frankly that the moratorium proposal "is unacceptable to the U.S. side."

C. Weinberger asserts to back up his position, that the United States has supposedly carried out fewer nuclear explosions than the Soviet Union at this stage. This argument, to Mr Weinberger's discomfiture, does not stand up to criticism. Here are some figures from the Stockholm Peace Research Institute -- a completely neutral organization.

According to this institute's information, by the beginning of 1985 the United States had carried out 772 nuclear explosions and the USSR 556. During the Soviet moratorium the discrepancy in favor of the United States increased still further.

Some people say that it is impossible to establish a moratorium on nuclear explosions because they are difficult to monitor. That "argument," like the previous one, is also off beam. First, virtually every explosion can be monitored by the national means possessed by each side. Second, international monitoring can be established. The Soviet Union agrees to that, to the point of on-site inspections.

What, then, is preventing the moratorium from becoming not just a unilateral, but a bilateral and then, a multilateral act? Perhaps the U.S. NATO allies do not want a moratorium? But the Soviet Union is ready to resume immediately, this very month, the tripartite talks (between the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain) on a complete and general halt to nuclear weapons tests. We are also ready to begin without delay multilateral talks on a test ban within the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. All the nuclear powers could take part in it.

It would appear that the sole reason preventing the United States now, as in the past, from joining the Soviet moratorium and subsequently going further -- toward a general halt to nuclear tests -- is pressure on the administration from the military-industrial complex, which has an interest in producing new kinds of nuclear armaments and consequently, in "trying them out" ["oprobvaniye"]. "The explanation," THE BOSTON GLOBE writes, "is that the administration wants to develop [razrabotat] new kinds of nuclear armaments, and that requires nuclear tests." Despite President Reagan's assurances in Geneva, another obstacle is clearly the dreams of certain U.S. military and political circles about gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union, dreams which are as dangerous as they are futile.

The USSR has done everything possible to create favorable conditions for an end to nuclear tests and thereby, to give mankind the key to the door of the future -- a world without nuclear weapons. But it must be taken into account that we cannot go on endlessly displaying unilateral restraint. M.S. Gorbachev gave a reminder of this once again in his recent messages to the leaders of six nonaligned countries.

The United States still has time to follow the Soviet Union's example and give a positive response to the peaceful Soviet initiatives.

Negative Stance Causes Concern

LD170037 Moscow TASS in English 1521 GMT 16 Feb 86

[Text] Moscow, February 16 TASS -- TASS political news analyst Yuriy Kornilov writes:

The public opinion poll conducted in the United States by the newspaper WASHINGTON POST jointly with the ABC Television network has shown that 74 per cent of the Americans support the U.S.S.R.'s proposals on the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Although the Pentagon hawks are at pains to intimidate the Americans with inventions about the non-existent "Soviet menace", realization grows among millions of U.S. citizens that time has come when it is necessary that the process of intensified material preparations for war should be stopped and reversed, and the threat of nuclear catastrophe overhanging mankind be removed. A ban on the tests of overkill nuclear weapons would be the first practical step towards this goal.

Back last year, the Soviet Union came up with a major and genuinely constructive initiative. It terminated unilaterally all nuclear tests and called on the United States to join in this action. On January 15, 1986, the U.S.S.R. announced that it extends the unilateral moratorium on any nuclear blasts by three months. It is clear that for our country to take such a decision was not a simple, an easy matter. The Soviet Union cannot display unilateral restraint with regard to nuclear tests ad infinitum. But the stakes are too high and the responsibility too great for us not to take every opportunity to influence the position of others through the force for example.

Keeping widely discussing and commenting on this step of good will by Moscow, prominent politicians and public figures in various countries and the press underline again and again that the importance of this action is truly hard to overestimate. For to terminate the nuclear tests means to put an end to perfection of nuclear arms, block the ways and opportunities for developing new and new types and varieties of weapons of destruction and death.

Nevertheless, Washington, at least until today, stubbornly refuses to follow the Soviet example and introduce a moratorium on nuclear blasts. Advocates of the arms race resort to all sorts of unseemly methods in their attempts to camouflage their true goals and whitewash their militarist stand. Now they set afloat a totally groundless version on certain "verification difficulties" which allegedly hamper a nuclear test ban.

Now they cite statements by Caspar Weinberger, U.S. defence secretary, and his likes and talk at length to the effect that the Soviet proposal on the moratorium is allegedly unacceptable since the U.S.S.R. has conducted more explosions at the present stage than the United States. In so doing, they overlook the fact that according to figures released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the United States set off 772 nuclear explosions by early 1985 while the U.S.S.R. -- 556, and within the period when the Soviet moratorium has been in effect the gap has widened still more in favour of the United States...

In reality, the matter is, certainly, not in the imaginary difficulties involved in verification and as imaginary U.S. lag but rather in the fact that certain quarters in the United States would like to continue with reliance on force in politics and intend to add new and new types of weapons to militarist arsenals, including and primarily within the framework of the so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative".

Senator Edward Kennedy wrote in THE WASHINGTON POST that "it is now possible to outline a series of far-reaching agreements which, with sufficient political will on the part of both sides, can be achieved in the next few years". As for the Soviet Union, its display of political will to detente and to curbing the arms race is at hand and the extension of the moratorium on all nuclear explosions is conclusive evidence of this. Will Washington display this will in action? The U.S. negative stand on such a crucial issue as a ban on nuclear tests regrettably prompts the thought that someone in the United States would obviously like to replace concrete steps on disarmament with rhetoric on the "need of arms control". This cannot fail to spark serious concern among both Soviet and international public...

U.S. Position Temed 'Irresponsible'

LB141546 Moscow TASS in English 1525 GMT 14 Feb 86

[Text] Moscow, February 14 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev.

Experts are unanimous that, within the broad range of possible practical actions on curbing the arms race, ending nuclear explosions would be the simplest and at the same time exclusively effective measure that would put an end to the process of developing new and perfecting the existing types of nuclear weapons.

To end the tests, it is necessary that each nuclear state issue as a first step a corresponding order to its military and scientific communities. Simultaneously, it will be possible to agree on concrete measures for checking compliance with the moratorium. Both the USSR and the United States possess technical means that make it possible to accurately determine the location and yield of any nuclear blasts, and to clearly distinguish them from earthquakes. In addition to the existing national means of verification, the Soviet Union offers the use of other, fundamentally new means. The USSR backed the proposal by several states to set up on their territories special stations to monitor compliance with the agreement banning the tests.

The Soviet side expressed its readiness to agree with the United States, after imposing a reciprocal moratorium on nuclear blasts, on some measures of on-site verification to lift doubts as to observance of the moratorium. The verification problem would thus be practically resolved. Using the strictest criteria, it can no longer be regarded as an obstacle in the way of an agreement on terminating nuclear explosions. The road would be ultimately paved for reaching an accord on a total prohibition of nuclear testing between the USSR, the United States and Britain to which other countries could join.

It is important to stress that, simple and reliable as the measures to end nuclear testing are, they can only be implemented given the readiness of at least two great powers -- the USSR and the United States -- to put roadblocks in the way of the nuclear arms race. The Soviet Union has already made the first step towards banning nuclear explosions. In a bid to set into motion the solution of the problem, the USSR unilaterally suspended all nuclear explosions from August 6 last year, and urged the United States to follow the good example. In January 1986, the Soviet Union extended the moratorium till March 31, and stated that it would remain in effect beyond that should the United States halt its own nuclear test programme.

Defying public protests, the United States responded to the Soviet Union's major good-will gesture with nuclear explosions at the Nevada test site. Washington's actions show that the United States remains committed to the illusory and peace-endangering goal of achieving military superiority.

The Soviet Union welcomes any practical steps that help reduce the level of military confrontation. In face of intensive military preparations of the United States, however, the USSR cannot display indefinitely its unilateral restraint, including in the sphere of nuclear testing.

The U.S. Administration, which constantly expresses its readiness "to go its mile towards disarmament", ought to corroborate its verbal declarations by practical deeds. Joining the Soviet moratorium on nuclear blasts could become the first positive step by the United States over the past five years in that direction.

The stakes are too high. The real chances of improving the overall climate of the international situation cannot be missed due to the shortsighted and irresponsible position of the United States towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

U.S., BRITAIN EXERT PRESSURE ON NEW ZEALAND

U.S. Fears 'Domino Effect'

LD016300 Moscow TASS in English 1201 GMT 6 Feb 86

[Text] Moscow, February 6 TASS -- TASS political news analyst Boris Chekhonin writes:

"Rainbow is unsinkable," says the legend on the badge of the Greenpeace environmentalist and anti-nuke organization, which has set out to have France stop its nuclear tests at Mururoa atoll in Polynesia. Men, women and children participating in mass demonstrations in New Zealand nowadays demand a ban on calls by U.S. nuclear-armed ships at the ports of the country. Time will tell if the anti-nuclear aspirations of millions of people in the South Pacific will come true. But nowadays Washington and its allies are doing whatever they can to kill the hopes of the population of the region for a nuclear-free future. This is exemplified by London's recent decision to play the role of Washington's Trojan horse.

The well-connected Australian newspaper AGE reports that in the middle of February Admiral John Fieldhouse, chief of defence staff of Great Britain, will pay a visit to New Zealand. The visit is intended to step up pressure on Wellington to make it revise its anti-nuclear stand.

The Government of New Zealand has submitted to parliament a draft bill banning calls by U.S. nuclear-armed warships at New Zealand ports.

The Australian newspaper is most probably right. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has more than once fumed against New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy and London has already announced that a task group of British warships will be dispatched to the Pacific this year.

Admiral Fieldhouse's visit and the dispatch of British warships to the Pacific can be viewed, and with good reason, as the Tories' attempt to make a contribution to the U.S. campaign of blackmail and pressure on New Zealand.

This pressure is explained most probably by Washington's fear of the "domino effect." The U.S. Administration is afraid that New Zealand's example will be followed by other countries. If this happens, Washington reasons, the U.S. nuclear forces will have to withdraw from other regions the peoples of which have long been opposed energetically to the dubious honour of being nuclear hostages to the USA. That is why London has been asked to bang its nuclear fist on the table.

British Admiral Applies Pressure

LD200747 Moscow TASS in English 0650 GMT 20 Feb 86

[Text] Paris, February 19 TASS -- Admiral John Fieldhouse, Britain's chief of defence staff, currently on a visit to New Zealand, has made an attempt to exert pressure on that country's government by declaring that cooperation between Britain and New Zealand might be jeopardised should the New Zealand Parliament endorse legislation on a nuclear-free zone, disarmament and arms control.

According to FRANCE PRESSE AGENCY, Adm. Fieldhouse stressed at a press conference in Wellington today that the ban on the entry of British warships to New Zealand ports is "going to make a very considerable difference to our normal relations."

New Zealand's parliamentary group, the Coalition Against Nuclear Warships, believes that the aim of the British naval chief's visit to New Zealand is to obtain its government's permission for British warships to enter the country's ports without declaring whether they carry nuclear weapons.

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CSO: 2500/1259

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA EDITORIAL: SOVIET RESTRAINT ON TESTING 'NOT INFINITE'

PM121654 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Feb 86 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Moratorium Is a Step Toward Peace Without Weapons"]

[Text] People live in hope. Whether growing grain or building houses, casting steel or drilling for oil, teaching children or creating new knowledge -- they remember the aim of their work and think about the future, about why they are alive and what they are working for. And they strive to leave something good behind them: to ensure that gardens blossom and grain grows; to ensure that children play and have happy lives; to ensure that peace reigns on earth.

That is why millions of people are listening with hope to the voice of our country and its noble call: To enter the 21st century without nuclear weapons; to eliminate the threat of nuclear catastrophe hanging over mankind; to make the power of the atom serve peace and peace alone. These goals are close to and understood by all people of goodwill -- irrespective of where they live or what they do. And we are rightly proud that it is our country -- the motherland of October and the first land of victorious socialism -- and our Leninist party striding toward its 27th Congress that placed such an inspiring, large-scale, and realistic program before the world.

In anything, the first step and the first movement toward the goal are particularly important. The statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, calls the ending of nuclear arms tests a practical step toward the elimination of these deadly weapons. Its importance -- for specialists and scientists, for politicians and military men, and for all sober-minded people -- is obvious. Ending tests means putting a stop to the improvement of terrible weapons and extinguishing the fire in the nuclear hearth. Ending tests means embarking in practice on the difficult but totally necessary work of saving mankind from the fear of being incarcerated in a nuclear holocaust. Ending tests means meeting each other halfway along the road of strengthening trust, the road of mutual understanding -- for the sake of life on earth and a peaceful future. What could be higher or more moral or noble than this great goal?

The Soviet Union is setting an example of serving the cause of peace -- not in words, but in deeds. We recall that in 1946 our country proposed declaring nuclear weapons illegal. It can only be regretted that its initiative and warning were not heeded by those who had previously sent aircraft with deadly cargoes to incinerate and wipe Hiroshima and Nagasaki from the face of the earth, those who would like to use the nuclear bomb as an instrument of political blackmail and keep people in the trap of fear of the nuclear threat.

When the poignant 40th anniversary of the Hiroshima tragedy was being marked worldwide the Soviet Union again proved that it is rightly called the standard-bearer of peace. The Soviet Union announced the introduction of a moratorium until the end of 1985 on all nuclear explosions and called on the United States to follow our example. Had the U.S. Administration responded to that call and taken the step the peoples expected of it, nuclear explosions could have been ended. One can understand the profound disappointment and concern of the world's public caused by the new underground nuclear weapons tests held by the U.S. side -- despite the peoples' protests and will and despite the voice of reason.

It is impossible not to notice and not to realize that these actions by Washington pursue the goal of attaining military superiority over the Soviet Union and dictating its will to the socialist community countries and other peoples. But we know and firmly declare: This is an unattainable dream. This is a fruitless and dangerous policy.

In the face of the Pentagon's military preparations the Soviet Union cannot display infinite unilateral restraint on nuclear tests. Peace will become lasting and unbreakable if all states make their contribution to safeguarding and strengthening it. Our country is again making efforts to influence the stance of others by the force of its example. The extension of the moratorium on all nuclear explosions until 31 March is yet another gesture of goodwill by the land of the Soviets, yet another attempt to halt the dangerous development of events before it is too late. This moratorium will remain in force if the United States also halts nuclear testing.

The USSR's stance is clear and fully corresponds with the interests of all peoples. We are in favor of blocking the channels for modernization of nuclear weapons and the opportunities to create [sozdavat] and test [oprovovat] new and increasingly sophisticated varieties of them on test sites. The monitoring [kontrol] of the termination of tests is no problem for us: It can be ensured by national technical means and also with the help of international procedures -- and on-site inspections when necessary. The Soviet Union has invited the United States to reach agreement on this.

We are in favor of the moratorium becoming a bilateral and subsequently, a multi-lateral action. We are in favor of resuming talks between the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain on a complete and universal ban on nuclear weapons tests. The Soviet Union is prepared for multilateral test ban talks within the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Conference in which all nuclear powers would take part. We agree with the nonaligned countries' proposals to hold consultations for the purpose of extending the validity of the 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater. Briefly, the Soviet Union welcomes any practical step leading to a peaceful goal.

Now it is up to the United States. Can the peoples of the world understand the position taken by those who, instead of giving a clear-cut answer to the USSR's call, continue, as before, to search for "submerged reefs" and "propaganda traps" in our proposals? Those who are accelerating the implementation of the "star wars" program and are stepping up their allies' involvement in it? Those who do not appear to have learned any lessons from the Challenger tragedy, which showed how dangerous the U.S. plans to place space weapons in earth orbit are for world civilization? No, such a position is impossible to understand and even more impossible to justify!

In their letters to newspaper editorial offices and in statements to the press, ordinary people and politicians from various countries are talking about their support for the Soviet's proposals and linking hopes for curbing the arms race to them. The White House must also heed the voice of the millions. History will not be forgiving if the chance offered by the Soviet Union's initiative is missed.

We believe peace will be preserved. It is within people's power to halt and ban all nuclear weapon tests and clear away the stockpiles of such weapons. This must be done as soon as possible. This is what common sense dictates. This is what the time demands.

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CSO: 5200/1259

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: FRG PARLIAMENTARIANS PRAISE TESTING BAN

LD231707 Moscow TASS in English 1618 GMT 23 Jan 86

[Text] Bonn, January 23 TASS -- TASS correspondent Sergey Sosnovskiy reports:

A parliamentary debate has been held at the FRG Bundestag today on the initiative of the SPD group on the question of prohibition of nuclear weapons testing and the stand of the FRG Government on that issue.

Speaking on behalf of his group Hermann Scheer, chairman of the group of deputies from the Social Democratic Party at the Bundestag Subcommittee on Disarmament and Arms Control, spoke highly of the USSR's proposals on the issue of putting an end to all nuclear testing, a moratorium which was unilaterally introduced by the USSR.

The FRG Government would be well advised to act in the spirit of its previous statements and declare in favour of concluding speedily an agreement providing for a full ban on nuclear weapons testing. Yet, H. Scheer stressed, the government remains inactive on these issues, thus renouncing the principles of the policy proclaimed by it. To all appearances, the FRG Government acts so only because the current U.S. Administration has no stake in a total ban on (nuclear weapons) the MP pointed out.

Speaking in the debate, representatives of the ruling right-wing bloc CDU/CSU were trying to reject the charges made against them. Yet they have failed to furnish convincing proofs that the FRG Government favours not just by word of mouth, but in action an end to nuclear weapons testing, which, as is known, could really reliably close the channels towards the perfection of nuclear weapons.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: EAST, WEST GERMAN PARTIES HOLD NUCLEAR-FREE TALKS

'Goes With' Gorbachev's Proposals

LD142022 Moscow TASS in English 1941 GMT 14 Feb 86

[Text] Moscow, February 14 TASS -- TASS commentator Lev Aksenov writes:

The delegations of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] had a meeting in Bonn today to discuss formation of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe. The significance of the meeting exceeds by far the limits of inter-party relations between the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. Considering the topicality of the problem, the solution of which is, in the final account, crucial to preservation of peace globally.

Socialist states, other countries put forward a number of proposals to deliver various regions from the most terrible weapons of mass destruction, created by man. Mention should be made here of the proposal of the GDR and Czechoslovakia to the FRG Government that a zone free from chemical weapons be formed in central Europe, the initiatives to make the Balkan peninsula and the north of Europe nuclear-free zones.

All these peace proposals go along with the comprehensive program of delivering the world from weapons of mass destruction, which was formulated in the January 15 statement by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev. The measures being discussed now on the banks of the Rhine River by representatives of political parties of both German states, will help mankind approach the third millennium in conditions of peace, security and confidence. The business-like discussion of one of the most important problems of European security, but not heightening of tension in one of the most "sensitive" parts of the planet -- this is the cardinal way to a world without weapons, a world without wars.

Commentary on Talks

LD152003 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 15 Feb 86

[Excerpts] In Bonn talks have taken place between delegates of the SPD and the SED on the question of creating a nuclear-free zone in central Europe. A commentary on the latest news; at the microphone is our political observer, Aleksandr Zholkver:

The meeting in Bonn in my opinion is noteworthy in many respects. First of all, it bears witness to the popularity of the idea of zones free from nuclear weapons. But you see, this idea is repeatedly anathematized by the NATO leadership which is certainly busy not limiting nuclear arms, but accumulating them. And now, despite the concentrated Atlantic propaganda about the blessing of U.S. nuclear missiles which are being sited in West Germany itself, one of the leading political parties of the country, the SPD, is unambiguously speaking out against the transatlantic nuclear gifts and in favor of declaring the FRG a nuclear-free zone. As far as the SED is concerned, it is, as is known, the ruling party in the GDR and has repeatedly supported at governmental level the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons in central Europe.

I point out in this connection that the idea of nuclear-free zones is spreading more and more not only in central Europe. I remind you that our country actively supports the idea of the creation of non-nuclear zones as one of the measures to limit nuclear arms and avert their gradual spread over the planet. The Soviet Union is ready to give effective guarantees to any country that refuses to site nuclear weapons on its territory.

Quite another stance is taken by the United States. Suffice it to remember how Washington was up in arms against New Zealand when its government refused to allow U.S. ships carrying nuclear arms into its ports. Nonetheless, the present discussions by the SPD and SED delegations on the question of creating nuclear-free zones clearly confirms that public opinion supports this idea as a considerable contribution to the strengthening of the cause for peace.

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CSO: 2500/1259

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: SOUTH PACIFIC GROUP IN MOSCOW FOR CONSULTATIONS

1D041638 Moscow TASS in English 1602 GMT 4 Feb 86

[Text] Moscow, February 4 TASS -- Consultations with a delegation of the South Pacific Forum (SPF) on questions of a treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific and protocols to it were held in the USSR Foreign Ministry on February 3-4.

The Soviet side has explained the concept of a nuclear-free world advanced in the statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev of January 15. It has been stressed that the implementation of the program of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere with the prevention of the emergence of space strike arms would lead to a radical improvement of the international situation on a long-term and stable basis. The attention has also been called to the Soviet Union's decision to extend till March 31 its earlier-announced unilateral moratorium on any nuclear explosions.

Thus, a favorable opportunity has been created to stop nuclear tests and to advance without delay to the conclusion of an international treaty on a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests.

The delegation of the South Pacific Forum highly assessed a complex of important initiatives set out in Mikhail Gorbachev's statement that evoked much interest of countries of the South Pacific region. The delegation of the South Pacific Forum welcomed the extension of the Soviet unilateral moratorium on any nuclear explosions and noted that the countries of the South Pacific Forum firmly declare for a complete cessation of nuclear tests by all nuclear states.

The Soviet side noted that the USSR views the creation of nuclear-free zones in various areas of the world as an important measure in the struggle to narrow the sphere of nuclear preparations. In its attitude to nuclear-free zones the Soviet Union does not make exception for any states, be it participants or non-participants in military alliances. If some or other country renounces the acquisition of nuclear weapons and does not have them on its territory, it gets firm and effective guarantees from the USSR. Proceeding from this principled stand, the Soviet Union has expressed from the outset its positive attitude to the efforts of the states of the South Pacific to create a nuclear-free zone.

During the consultations the Soviet side said that the establishment of a zone free from nuclear weapons in the South Pacific is an important contribution to fashioning a reliable security system in Asia and the Pacific, narrows the geographical bounds of the

spread of nuclear weapons and facilitates the fulfilment of the task of doing away with nuclear weapons on earth once and for all and preventing an arms race in outer space. The treaty on the nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific together with the protocols to it in their present form basically correspond to the criteria suggested by the Soviet Union for nuclear-free zones.

It was noted with satisfaction that the treaty provides for a commitment to support efforts to preserve the effectiveness of the international regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, based on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. At the same time the Soviet side pointed out the importance of making certain that the agreement creating the nuclear-free zone really ensures the making of the territories of the signatory states into a zone completely free from nuclear weapons. This presupposes, in particular, a ban on the transit through the nuclear-free zone's territory of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, including visits at ports and air fields there by foreign warships and aircraft with nuclear weapons aboard. The delegation from the South Pacific Forum was also told of a number of other considerations and asked questions concerning individual provisions of the treaty and the accompanying protocols.

The delegation from the South Pacific Forum expressed gratitude for the Soviet Union's support for the decisions taken by the SPP countries to declare the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone, took note of the considerations voiced by the Soviet side and gave corresponding explanations.

The consultations involved V.F. Petrovskiy, a member of the Collegium of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR, other senior officials from the Foreign Ministry of the USSR and a representative of the Defense Ministry of the USSR on the Soviet side and SPP delegation leader David Saldier of Australia, Christopher Beeby of New Zealand, Gracie Fong of Fiji, Joseph Gabut of Papua New Guinea, Levi Laka of the Solomon Islands and Anthony Manaranji of the Cook Islands as well as Allerton Stokes, ambassador of New Zealand to the USSR, and Robert Tyson, charge d'affaires and interim of Australia to the USSR, on the side of the South Pacific Forum.

The members of the SPP delegation were received by N.S. Kapitsa, a deputy foreign minister of the USSR who had a conversation with them on issues of mutual interest.

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CSO: 5200/1259

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

HELSINKI: SOVIET STANCE ON NORDIC NFZ CLARIFIED

LD191310 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 0600 GMT 19 Feb 86

[Text] The Soviet Union has clarified its stance on a Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone and the nuclear-free status of the Baltic. The pseudonymous Yuriy Komissarov says in an article published by OULU [word indistinct] (?today) that an erroneous interpretation has been presented in the Scandinavian countries of the Soviet Union's stance on proclaiming the Baltic a nuclear-free zone. Komissarov describes as erroneous the interpretation according to which the Soviet Union would be prepared to discuss the nuclear-free status of the Baltic only in connection with more general European security problems.

Komissarov describes as consistent the stance of the Scandinavian countries according to which their position as nuclear-weapons free countries is possible only if nuclear weapons are removed from the sea area bordering them.

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RELATED ISSUES

GORBACHEV'S 27TH CPSU CONGRESS SPEECH

LD250743 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0718 GMT 25 Feb 86

[Political report of the CPSU Central Committee delivered 25 February by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the 27th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses—live. Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 26 February in its Second Edition publishes M.S. Gorbachev's report on pages 2-10; the PRAVDA Russian version has been compared to this Moscow Television version and variations have been noted throughout the text]

[Excerpts] Comrade delegates, esteemed guests:

The 27th Congress of the CPSU has gathered at an abrupt turning point in the life of the country and the contemporary world as a whole. We are beginning our work with a deep understanding of our responsibility to the party and the Soviet people. It is our task to conceptualize broadly, in Lenin's style, the times we are living in, and to work out a realistic, thoroughly weighed program of action that will organically blend the grandeur of our aims with the realism of our capabilities, and the party's plans with the hopes and aspirations of every person. The resolutions of the 27th congress will determine both the character and the rate of our movement towards a qualitatively new condition of the Soviet socialist society for years and decades ahead.

The congress is to discuss and adopt a new edition of the CPSU Program, amendments to the party rules, and guidelines for economic development in the next 5 years and the longer term. I need hardly mention what enormous importance these documents have for our party, our state, and our people. Not only do they contain an assessment of the past and a definition of the urgent tasks, but also a glimpse into the future. They speak of what the Soviet Union will be like as it enters the 21st century, of the image of socialism and its positions in the international arena, of the future of humanity.

Soviet society has come a long way in its development since the now-operative party program was adopted. In substance, we have built the whole country anew, have made tremendous headway in the economic, cultural, and social fields, and have raised generations of builders of the new society. We have blazed the trail into outer space for humanity. We have secured strategic military parity and have thereby substantially restricted imperialism's aggressive plans and capabilities to start a nuclear war. The positions of our motherland and of world socialism in the international arena have grown considerably stronger.

The path traveled by the country, its economic, social and cultural achievements, convincingly confirm the vitality of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and socialism's tremendous potential as embodied in the progress of Soviet society. We can be legitimately proud of everything that has been achieved in these years of intense labor and struggle. [applause]

The situation has come to a turning point not only in internal but also in external affairs. The changes in current world affairs are so deep-going and significant that they require reassessment and comprehensive analysis of all factors. The situation created by nuclear confrontation calls for new approaches, methods, and forms of relations between the different social systems, states, and regions.

The arms race started by imperialism has resulted in the 20th century in world politics ending with the question of whether humanity manages to elude the nuclear danger, or if the policy of confrontation will take precedence, increasing the probability of nuclear conflict. The capitalist world has not abandoned the ideology and policy of hegemonism; its rulers have not yet lost the hope of taking social revenge and continue to indulge themselves with illusions of superior strength. The sober view of what is going on is bawing its way forward with great difficulty through a dense thicket of prejudices and preconceptions in the thinking of the ruling class. But the complexity and acuteness of this moment in history makes it increasingly vital to outlaw nuclear weapons, destroy them and other weapons of mass annihilation completely, and improve international relations.

The progress of humanity is also directly connected with the scientific and technological revolution. It matured slowly and gradually, and then, in the final quarter of the century, gave the start to a gigantic accretion of man's material and spiritual resources. They were of two kinds. A qualitative leap was registered in humanity's productive forces. But there was also a qualitative leap in means of destruction, in military matters, endowing man for the first time in history with the physical capacity for destroying all life on earth.

The facets and consequences of the scientific and technological revolution vary in the different socio-political systems. The capitalism of the 1980s, the capitalism of the age of electronics and computer science, computers and robots, is leaving more millions of people, including young and educated people, without jobs. Wealth and power are being increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few. Militarism is gorging itself on the arms race to an incredible degree, striving to gain control, little by little, over the political levers of power. It is becoming the ugliest and the most dangerous monster of the 20th century. By its efforts, the most advanced scientific and technical ideas are being converted into weapons of mass destruction.

The difficulty that the ruling classes of the capitalist world have in understanding the realities, the periodical recurrence of attempts at resolving by force the whole group of contradictions dividing the two worlds are, of course, anything but accidental. Imperialism is prompted by its intrinsic mainsprings and very socioeconomic essence to translate the competition of the two systems into the language of military confrontation. By dint of its social nature, imperialism ceaselessly generates aggressive, adventurous policy.

Here we can speak of a whole complex of impelling motives: the predatory appetites of the arms manufacturers and the influential military-bureaucratic groups, the selfish interest of the monopolies in sources of raw materials and sales markets, the bourgeoisie's fear of the ongoing changes, and, lastly, the attempts to resolve its own, worsening problems at socialism's expense.

The latter are especially typical of U.S. imperialism. It was nothing but imperial ideology and policy, the wish to create the most unfavorable external conditions for socialism and for the USSR that prompted the start of the race of nuclear and other arms after 1945, just when the crushing defeat of fascism and militarism was, it would seem, offering a realistic opportunity for building a world without wars, and a mechanism of international cooperation — the United Nations — had been created for this purpose. But imperialism's nature asserted itself that time again.

Today, too, the right wing of the U.S. monopoly bourgeoisie regards the stoking up of international tensions as something that justifies military allocations, claims to global supremacy, interference in the affairs of other states, and an offensive against the interests and rights of the American working people. No small role seems to be played by the calculation of using tension to exercise pressure on the allies, to make them completely obedient, to subordinate them to Washington's dictation.

The policy of total contention, of military confrontation, has no future. Flight into the past is no response to the challenges of the future. It is rather an act of despair which, however, does not make this posture any less dangerous. Washington's deeds will show when and to what extent it will understand this. We, for our part, are ready to do everything we can in order to radically improve the international situation. To achieve this, socialism need not renounce any of its principles or ideals. It has always stood for, and continues to stand for, the peaceful coexistence of states belonging to different social systems. [applause]

As distinct from imperialism, which is trying to halt the course of history by force and to regain what it had in the past, socialism has never, of its own free will, related its future to any military solution of international problems. This was borne out at the very first big discussion that took place in our country after the victory of the Great October Revolution. During that discussion, as we may recall, the views of the Left Communists and the Trotskyites, who championed the theory of revolutionary war which, they claimed, would carry socialism to other countries, were firmly rejected. This position, as Lenin emphasized in 1918, would be completely at variance with Marxism, for Marxism has always been opposed to pushing revolutions, which developed with the growing acuteness of the class antagonisms that engender revolutions. Today, too, we are firmly convinced that pushing revolutions from outside, and doubly so by military means, is futile and inadmissible.

The problems and crises experienced by the capitalist world arise within its own womb and are a natural result of the internal antagonistic contradictions of the old society. In this sense, capitalism negates itself as it develops. Unable to cope with the acute problems of the declining phase of capitalism's development, the ruling circles of the imperialist countries resort to means and methods that are obviously incapable of saving the society which history has doomed.

The myth of a Soviet or communist threat that is being circulated today is meant to justify the arms race and the imperialist countries' own aggressiveness. But it is becoming increasingly clear that the path of war can yield no sensible solutions, either international or domestic. The clash and the struggle between the opposite approaches to the long-term prospects for world development have become especially complex in nature. Now that the world has huge nuclear stockpiles and the only thing experts argue about is how many times or dozens of times humanity can be destroyed, it is high time to begin a practical withdrawal from balancing on the brink of war, from an equilibrium of fear, to normal, civilized forms of relations between the states of the two systems.

In the years to come, the main struggle will evidently center on the actual content of the policy that can safeguard peace. It will be a complicated and many-sided struggle, because we are dealing with a society whose ruling circles [*PRAVDA* substitutes "leading circles" for "ruling circles"] refuse to assess the realities of the world and its perspectives in sober terms, or to draw serious conclusions from their own experience and that of others. All this is an indication of the wear and tear suffered by its internal systems of immunity, of its social senility, which reduces the probability of far-reaching changes in the policy of the dominant forces and augments its degree of recklessness.

That is why it is not easy at all, in the current circumstances, to predict the future of the relations between the socialist and the capitalist countries, the USSR and the United States. The decisive factors here will be the correlation of forces on the world scene, the growth and activity of the peace potential, and its capability of effectively repelling the threat of nuclear war. Much will depend, too, on the degree of realism that Western ruling circles will show in assessing the situation. But it is unfortunate when not only the eyesight but also the soul of politicians is blind. With nuclear war being totally unacceptable, peaceful coexistence rather than confrontation of the systems should be the rule in the interstate relations.

The relations between the three main centres of present-day imperialism — the United States, Western Europe, and Japan — abound in visible and concealed contradictions. The economic, financial, and technological superiority which the United States enjoyed over its closest competitors until the end of the 1960s has been put to a serious trial. Western Europe and Japan managed to outdo their American patron in some things, and are also challenging the United States in such a traditional sphere of U.S. hegemony as that of the latest technology.

Washington is continuously calling on its allies not to waste their gunpowder on internecine strife. But how are the three centres of modern-day imperialism to share one roof if the Americans themselves, manipulating the dollar and the interest rates, are

not loath to fatten their economy at the expense of Western Europe and Japan? Wherever the three imperialist centers manage to coordinate their positions, this is more often than not the effect of American pressure or outright dictation, and works in the interests and aims above all of the United States. This, in turn, sharpens, rather than blunts, the contradictions.

It appears that people are beginning to wonder about this cause-and-effect relationship. For the first time, governments of some West European countries, the Social Democratic and Liberal parties, and the public at large have begun to openly discuss whether present U.S. policy coincides with Western Europe's notions about its own security and whether the United States is going too far in its claims to leadership. The partners of the United States have had more than one occasion to see that someone else's spectacles cannot substitute for one's own eyes.

The clash of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies will, no doubt, continue as a result of changes in the correlation of forces within the imperialist system. Still, the existing complex of economic, politico-military and other common interests of the three centers of power can hardly be expected to break up in the prevailing conditions of the present-day world. But within the framework of this complex, Washington should not expect unquestioning obedience to U.S. dictation on the part of its allies and competitors, and especially so to the detriment of their own interests.

We are perfectly well aware that not everything by far is within our power and that much will depend on the West, on its leaders' ability to see things in sober perspective at important crossroads of history. The U.S. President said once that if our planet were threatened by a landing from another planet, the USSR and the United States would quickly find a common language. But isn't a nuclear disaster a more tangible danger than a landing of unknown extraterrestrials? Isn't the ecological threat big enough? Don't all countries have a common stake in finding a sensible and fair approach to the problems of the developing states and peoples?

Lastly, isn't all the experience accumulated by mankind enough to draw perfectly justified practical conclusions today rather than wait until some other crisis breaks out? What does the United States hope to win in the long term by producing doctrines that can no longer fit U.S. security into the modest dimensions of our planet?

Striving to keep in the saddle of history, imperialism is resorting to all possible means. But such a policy is costing the world dearly. The nations are compelled to pay an ever higher price for it. To pay both directly and indirectly. To pay with millions of human lives, with a depletion of national resources, with the diversion of gigantic sums on the arms race. With the failure to solve numerous, increasingly difficult problems. And in the long run, perhaps, with the highest price possible that can be imagined.

The U.S. ruling circles are clearly losing their realistic bearings in this far from simple period of history. Aggressive international behavior, increasing militarization of politics and thinking, contempt for the interests of others — all this is leading to an

inevitable moral and political isolation of U.S. imperialism, widening the abyss between it and the rest of humanity. It is as though the opponents of peace in that country are unaware that when nuclear weapons are at the ready, the time and space for civilization lose their habitual outlines, and mankind becomes the captive of chance.

Will the ruling centers of the capitalist world manage to embark on the path of sober, constructive assessments of what is going on? The easiest thing is to say: Maybe yes and maybe no. But history denies us the right to make such predictions. We cannot take no for an answer to the question: Will mankind survive or not? We say: The progress of society, the life of civilization, must and will continue. [applause]

We say this not only by dint of the optimism that is inherent in Communists, by dint of our faith in people's intelligence and common sense. We are realists and are perfectly well aware that the two worlds are divided by very many things, and deeply divided, too. But we also see clearly that the need to resolve most vital problems affecting all humanity must prompt them to interaction, awaking humanity's heretofore unseen powers of self-preservation. And here is the stimulus for solutions commensurate with the realities of our time.

The course of history, of social progress, requires ever more insistently that there should be constructive and creative interaction between states and peoples on the scale of the entire world. Not only does it so require, but it also creates the requisite political, social, and material premises for it.

Such interaction is essential in order to prevent nuclear catastrophe, in order that civilization could survive. It is essential in order that other worldwide problems that are growing more acute should also be resolved jointly in the interests of all concerned. The realistic dialectics of present-day development consists in a combination of competition and confrontation between the two systems and in a growing tendency towards interdependence of the countries of the world community. This is precisely the way, through the struggle of opposites, through arduous effort, groping in the dark to some extent, as it were, that the contradictory but interdependent and in many ways integral world is taking shape.

The Communists have always been aware of the intrinsic complexity and contradictoriness of the paths of social progress. But at the center of these processes — and this is the chief distinction of the communist world outlook — there unfailingly stands man, his interests and cares. Human life, the possibilities for its comprehensive development, as Lenin stressed, is of the greatest value; the interests of social development rank above all else. That is what the CPSU takes its bearing from in its practical policy. (*PRAVDA* substitutes "activity" for "policy") [applause]

As we see it, the main road of march in contemporary conditions is to create worthy, truly human material and spiritual conditions of life for all nations, to see to it that our planet should be habitable, and to deal with its riches rationally. (*PRAVDA* renders this sentence: "We proceed from the premise that the main direction of struggle in contemporary conditions...") Above all, to deal rationally with the chief value of all — with people

and all their potentialities. That is exactly where we offer the capitalist system to compete with us in a setting of lasting peace. [applause]

[Ligachev interrupts] Comrades, allow me to announce an interval until 1150. A 30-minute break is announced.

[Announcer] Comrades, a break has been announced in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. Afterward Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee will continue the political report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th CPSU Congress. Here now is a concert of classical Russian music. [concert begins]

[*PRAVDA* inserts a section subhead: "The Acceleration of the Country's Socioeconomic Development - a Strategic Course"]

[Gorbachev resumes] Comrades, in putting forward its strategy for accelerating the social and economic development of the country at the April plenum, the CPSU Central Committee thereby made a decision of historic importance. It received the broad support of the party and of all the people, and is being put forward for examination by the congress.

[*PRAVDA* here inserts a sectional subhead: "IV. Basic Objectives and Directions of the Party's Foreign Policy Strategy"]

Comrades, the fundamental tasks of the country's economic and social development also determine the CPSU's international strategy. Its main objective is perfectly clear: to provide the Soviet people with the opportunity to work in conditions of lasting peace and freedom. Such, essentially, is the party's primary program requirement for our foreign policy. In the present situation its fulfillment means, first and foremost, putting a stop to material preparations for a nuclear war. Having thoroughly evaluated the situation which has developed, the CPSU has advanced an integral program for the complete liquidation of mass-destruction weapons before the end of the present century, a program which is historic in its scope and importance. Its implementation would open before mankind a principally different phase of development and an opportunity to concentrate on constructive work and nothing else.

As you know, we have addressed our proposals not just through the traditional diplomatic channels, but also directly to world public opinion, to the peoples. The time has come to fully understand the grim reality of our times: Nuclear weapons conceal within them a tornado which is capable of sweeping the human race from the face of the earth. Our address emphasizes yet again the open, honest, Leninist nature of the CPSU's foreign policy strategy.

Socialism unreservedly rejects wars as a means of settling interstate political and economic differences and ideological disputes. Our ideal is a world without weapons and coercion, a world in which every people may choose its path of development and its way of life freely. [applause]

This is an expression of the humanism of communist ideology and its moral values. That is why the struggle against the nuclear danger and the arms race and for maintaining and strengthening universal peace will remain, in the future, the main trend of the party's activity in the world arena. There is no alternative to this policy. This is even truer in a period of exacerbation in international affairs.

Never, perhaps, in the postwar decades has the situation in the world been as explosive and hence, more difficult and unfavorable — as in the first half of the eighties. The right-wing group which has come to power in the United States and its [PRAVDA adds "main"] fellow travelers in NATO have turned sharply away from detente to a military policy of force. They have armed themselves with doctrines which reject neighborliness and cooperation as principles of world development and as a political philosophy in international relations.

The Washington administration has remained deaf to our calls to halt the arms race and make the situation more healthy. Perhaps it isn't worth harping on the past; especially now, when it seems that signs of a change for the better are appearing in Soviet-U.S. relations and when realistic tendencies are again becoming visible in the acts, mood, and leadership of some NATO countries? We consider that it is worth it, since the sharp cooling of the international climate in the first half of the eighties reminded us once again that nothing happens of its own accord. Peace has to be fought for, fought for persistently and purposefully. [applause]

It is necessary to search for, find, and use even the smallest chance which might make it possible to break the trend of growing military danger [PRAVDA renders the preceding sentence: "...the smallest chance in order to break... while it is still possible — the trend of..."] Realizing this, the CPSU Central Committee again analyzed the nature and scale of the nuclear threat at its April plenum and determined practical steps which could lead to an improvement in the situation. We based ourselves on the following principled considerations:

Firstly: The nature of today's weapons leaves no state any hope of defending itself with military-technical means alone — let's say, by creating a defense [system], even the most powerful. Ensuring security is taking the form more and more of a political task and it can only be solved by political means. [applause] First and foremost, the will to go along the path of disarmament is needed. Security cannot be built forever on a fear of revenge. [PRAVDA substitutes "retribution" for "revenge"], that is, on the doctrine of restraint or deterrent; to say nothing of the absurdity and immorality of a situation when the whole world becomes a nuclear hostage and these doctrines encourage the arms race, which sooner or later is capable of getting out of control.

Secondly, security, when one speaks of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, can only be mutual if one considers international relations as whole [PRAVDA renders the preceding sentence: "...only be mutual, and it can only be universal if one considers..."] The highest wisdom is not in only

worrying about oneself or, even more, about damaging the other side; it is necessary for all to feel they are equally secure, because the terrors and alarms of the nuclear age give rise to unpredictability in policy and specific actions. Taking the critical significance of the time factor into account is becoming very important. The emergence of new weapons systems for mass annihilation is steadfastly reducing the time and restricting the opportunities for adopting political decisions on issues of war and peace in the event of crises.

Thirdly, the United States and its military-industrial machine, which so far does not intend to slow its pace, remains the locomotive of militarism. This must of course be taken into account. But we understand very well that the interests and goals of the military-industrial complex are by no means the same as the interests and goals of the U.S. people and the genuine national interests of that great country. The world is naturally much larger than the United States and its bases of occupation abroad, and in world politics one must not just restrict oneself to relations with just one country, although it is a very important one. As experience shows, this only encourages the arrogance of strength. But, of course we attach great importance to the state and nature of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Our countries have many points of contact and there is an objective need to live in peace with each other, to cooperate on an equal and mutually beneficial basis, but only an equal and mutually beneficial one. [applause]

Fourthly, the world is in the middle of a process of rapid change and nobody is capable of preserving an eternal status quo in it. It consists of many tens of states, each of which has its own, quite legitimate interests. All of them are without exception faced with a fundamental task: that of mastering the science and the art of behaving with restraint and circumspection in the international arena, living in a civilized way, that is, in conditions of correct international intercourse and cooperation, without turning a blind eye to social, political, and ideological contradictions.

But in order to bring this cooperation out into the wide expanse, a comprehensive system of international economic security is also necessary, which would defend every state equally from discrimination, sanctions, and other attributes of imperialist neo-colonialist policies. Such a system is capable, alongside disarmament, of becoming a reliable buttress of international security in general. [applause]

In a word, the contemporary world has become too small and fragile for wars and policies of force. It is impossible to save and preserve it unless a resolute and irrevocable break is made in the way of thinking and acting which for centuries was based on the acceptability and admissibility of wars and armed conflict. This means realizing that it is already impossible to win the arms race just as it is impossible to win nuclear war itself. Continuing such a race on earth and still more, spreading it into space will step up the already critically high pace of accumulation and improvement of nuclear weapons. The situation in the world could become such that it would no longer depend on the reason or will of politicians; it will find itself in the captivity of technology and of military and technocratic logic. Consequently, not only nuclear war itself, but also preparation for it — that is the

arms race and an aspiration to military superiority — cannot objectively bring political gain to anyone. Further, this means realizing that the present level of the balance of nuclear potential between the opposing sides is inordinately high. At present it provides equal danger to each of them, but only for the moment. Continuing the nuclear arms race will inevitably increase this equal danger and could take it to such a point that even parity would cease to be a factor in military and political restraint.

Therefore, it is essential, above all, to considerably reduce the level of military confrontation. In our time genuine equal security is guaranteed not by the highest possible, but by the lowest possible level of strategic balance from which it is essential to exclude nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction entirely. [applause]

Finally, that means recognizing that in the present situation there is no alternative to cooperation and interaction between all states. Thus, objective conditions — and I stress objective — have arisen in which the confrontation between capitalism and socialism can take place only, and exclusively, in the form of peaceful competition and peaceful rivalry. For us, peaceful coexistence is a political course which the Soviet Union intends to rigorously keep to in the future. [applause]

Ensuring the continuity of its foreign policy strategy, the CPSU will pursue an active international policy which proceeds from the realities of the modern world. Of course, it is not possible to solve the problem of international security with one or two even very intensive peace offensives. Only consistent, systematic, and persistent work can bring success. Continuity in foreign policy has nothing in common with the simple repetition of what has already been covered, especially in approaching problems which have mounted up. What is needed is particular accuracy in evaluating one's own possibilities, restraint, and the highest responsibility when making decisions. Firmness in upholding principles and positions is necessary, tactical flexibility and readiness for mutually acceptable compromises — the aim being not confrontation, but dialogue and mutual understanding. As you know, we have undertaken a series of unilateral steps. We introduced a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, we reduced the number of them and suspended all nuclear explosions. In Moscow and abroad conversations have been conducted with the leaders and members of governments of many states in the world.

The Soviet-Indian, Soviet-French, and Soviet-U.S. summit meetings have been necessary and useful steps. The Soviet Union has made active efforts, striving to lend fresh impetus to the talks in Geneva, Stockholm, and Vienna, the aim of which is to curtail the arms race and to strengthen trust between states. Talks are always a delicate matter, not a simple one. The main thing here is to move toward a mutually acceptable balance of interests, to transform mass destruction weapons into a subject of political negotiations is at the very least immoral and politically irresponsible. Finally, there is our 15 January statement.

On the whole, our program is essentially a fusion of the philosophy of shaping world security in the nuclear and space age with a platform of specific actions. The Soviet Union proposes that the problem of disarmament be approached in its entirety, because

as far as security is concerned, one thing is connected with another. It is not a matter of rigid linkages or attempts to give way in one direction in order to put up barricades in another. The matter is precisely about a plan of specific actions with strictly calculated times. The Soviet Union intends to persistently strive for its realization, viewing this as the central direction of its foreign policy in the forthcoming years. [applause]

Soviet military doctrine is being drawn up in full accordance with the letter and spirit of the initiatives put forward. Its orientation is unequivocally one of defense. In the military sphere we intend to act in the future so that no one has any grounds for fears, even if they are imagined, for their security. But, both we and our allies to an equal degree want to be delivered from the feeling of the threat which has come to hang over us.

The Soviet Union has taken upon itself the obligation not to use nuclear weapons first and will abide by it in the strictest manner. [applause] But it is no secret that scenarios for a nuclear attack on us do exist. We have no right to not take them into account. The Soviet Union is a highly convinced opponent of nuclear war in any of its forms. Our country stands for taking weapons of mass destruction out of circulation and restricting military potential within the bounds of reasonable sufficiency. But the nature and level of those bounds continue to be limited by the positions and actions of the United States and its bloc partners. In these conditions, we repeat again and again: The Soviet Union lays no claim to greater security, but will not settle for less. [applause]

I would like to focus attention on the problems of verification [kontrol], to which we attach particular significance. We have frequently declared: The Soviet Union is open to verification [kontrol]. We have an interest in it, no less than others. Comprehensive and very rigorous inspection [prverka] is, perhaps, one of the most important elements in the process of disarmament. The essence of the matter, as we see it, is as follows: Disarmament without verification [kontrol] is impossible, but also verification [kontrol] without disarmament is meaningless. [applause]

And one other fundamental point: We have expressed our attitude to "star wars" in detail. The United States has already involved many allies in that program. The matter threatens to take on an irreversible character. It is absolutely essential to look for realistic solutions which would prevent the transfer of the arms race into space before it is too late. The "star wars" program must not be allowed to be used both as a stimulus for a further arms race and as an obstruction on the road to radical disarmament.

Tangible progress in matters pertaining to acute reduction in nuclear capacities could be of serious assistance in overcoming this obstacle. This is why the Soviet Union is ready to make a real step in this direction — to resolve the issue of medium-range missiles in the European zone separately and not in direct connection with problems of strategic weapons and space. The Soviet program has been enthusiastically taken up by millions of people. The interest of politicians and public figures in it continues to grow. Now times are such that it is difficult to brush it aside. Attempts to cast doubt on the Soviet Union's businesslike interest in accelerating and transferring onto practical lines the solution of the pressing problem of our time — the abolition of nuclear weapons — are becoming less and less convincing.

Nuclear disarmament cannot remain the monopoly of politicians — this is what the whole world is reflecting upon today — for it concerns life itself. But one should also take into account the reaction of the center of power, which holds the key to the success or failure of the disarmament talks.

Of course, the U.S. ruling class, or to be more precise, its most egoistic groups tied up with the military-industrial complex, has different and clearly opposite aims from our own. For them disarmament means a loss in profits, a political risk. For us it means good in all respects: economic, political, moral. [applause]

We know our main opponents. We have built up complex and lengthy experience in relations and talks with them.

The day before yesterday we received a response from President Reagan to our 15 January statement. That is the day before yesterday. The U.S. side has begun putting forward its ideas in greater detail at the Geneva talks. Of course we will attentively study everything that the Americans submit on these questions.

But since the response was received literally on the eve of the congress opening, the U.S. Administration, or at least this is what we suppose, is obviously calculating that the world would learn about our attitude to the U.S. position from this very rostrum.

I can say straight away that the President's letter gives no foundation for any amendment to the appraisals of the world situation laid down in the report prior to receiving the message. It says the elimination of nuclear weapons is the goal toward which all nuclear powers should strive. In the letter the President agrees in general with some of the Soviet attitudes and intentions on questions of disarmament and security. In other words, the response does express some sort of reassuring opinions and attitudes. But these positive pronouncements are lost in various kinds of reservations, making things conditional on each other and conditions which, in fact, block the solution of fundamental disarmament questions.

The reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals is made conditional on our agreement to "star wars" programs and, incidentally, on unilateral reductions in Soviet conventional weaponry. Problems of regional conflicts and bilateral relations are tied in with this as well.

The elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe is blocked by references to the British and French positions and by a demand for our defense in the east of the country to be weakened, while U.S. military forces in this region would be maintained.

A refusal to halt nuclear tests is justified by expatiations to the effect that nuclear weapons serve as a restraining factor. Here there is a direct contradiction with the aim, corroborated in the letter, and with the need to eliminate nuclear weapons. It is precisely on the question of nuclear explosion, the end to which is demanded by the whole world, that the unwillingness of the United States and its ruling forces to take the path of nuclear disarmament is displayed in its most naked form. In a word, without going into details, it is difficult to observe a serious readiness on the part of the U.S. leadership to embark in reality on the solution of the cardinal problems of the elimination of the nuclear threat in the document which we have just received.

It seems that Washington — and not just Washington — has come to like nuclear weapons and is linking them with its plans in the international arena. Nevertheless, whether they want to or not, the politicians in the West will have to answer the question: Are they at all prepared to part with nuclear weapons? [applause]

In accordance with the accord which was reached in Geneva, a new meeting with the U.S. President lies ahead. We see its significance in providing practical results to the very important aspects of limiting and reducing armaments. There are at least two questions on which an accord could be reached: the halting of nuclear tests and the elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in the European zone. Then, incidentally, if there is a readiness to seek agreement, the question of the dates of the meeting will resolve itself. We will accept any proposal on that score. But there is no point in carrying on idle conversations. We will not remain unconcerned if the Soviet-U.S. dialogue which has arisen and which inspires certain, and not unfounded, hopes for changes for the better is used for the continuation of the arms race and material preparation for war.

The Soviet Union is firmly disposed to justifying the hopes of the peoples of our two countries and of the whole world, which awaits concrete steps, practical actions, and real accords [trehatye dogovorennosti] on how to check the arms race from the Soviet and U.S. leaders. We are prepared for this. [applause]

Like any other country, we naturally attach great significance to the security of our borders, both land and sea. We have many and different neighbors, we have no territorial claims against any of them, and we threaten none of them. But, as life has confirmed more than once, there are more than a few who, without taking account of the national interests of our country nor the states neighboring us, would aspire to aggravate the situation on the borders of the Soviet Union.

For example, counterrevolution and imperialism have turned Afghanistan into a running sore. The Soviet Union supports this country's efforts which are directed at the defense of its own sovereignty. We would like in the near future [zurhe v samsom blizkem budushchem] to bring the Soviet forces — situated in Afghanistan at the request of its government — back to their homeland. The time scale [zroki] for their step-by-step withdrawal has been worked out with the Afghan side, as soon as a political settlement has been achieved which will provide for a real end to and reliably guarantee a non-renewal of the outside armed interference in the internal affairs of the DRA. [applause] Our vital national interest lies in unfailingly good and peaceful relations with all states bordering on the Soviet Union. This is an essentially important aim of our foreign policy. [applause]

The CPSU considers one of the basic sectors of its foreign policy to be the European one: Europe's historic chance, and its future, lies in peaceful cooperation between the states of that continent. And it is important, while preserving the capital that has been built up, to move forward from the initial phase of detente to a more stable, mature detente, then to the creation of reliable security on the basis of the Helsinki process and radical cuts in nuclear and conventional arms.

The Asian and Pacific sector is of growing importance. In that extensive region there are many tangled knots and contradictions; the political situation in individual places is unstable. This is where it is necessary for them to find solutions and paths, without delay. Evidently, a beginning should be made with coordination and then, with uniting efforts in the interests of a political settlement of troublesome questions, so that, working in parallel on that basis, at least the acuteness of military confrontation in different areas of Asia might be removed and the situation there be stabilized.

That is all the more urgent since, in Asia and in other continents, the sparks that could lead to war have not gone out. We are in favor of stepping up a collective search for ways to solve conflict situations in the Near and Middle East, in Central America and southern Africa, and in all the seething points of the planet. This is what the interests of universal security insistently demand.

Crimes and conflicts are also fertile ground for international terrorism. Undeclared wars, the export of counterrevolution in all its forms, political assassinations, hostage taking, aircraft hijackings, explosions in streets, airports, or railway stations — this is the loathsome face of terrorism, which those inspiring it try to disguise with various kinds of cynical fabrications.

[... Soviet Union rejects terrorism in principle and is prepared for effective cooperation with other states in order to root it out. The Soviet Union will resolutely protect its citizens from acts of violence and will do all it can to protect their lives, honor, and dignity. [applause]]

Looking back on the past year, one cannot fail to see that the preconditions for an improvement in the international situation are, judging by everything, beginning to form. But the preconditions for a change are not yet the change itself. The arms race continues and the threat of nuclear war remains. However, international reaction is by no means all-powerful. The development of the world revolutionary process and the rise of mass democratic and antiwar movements have considerably expanded and strengthened the enormous potential of peace, reason, and goodwill. This is a powerful counterweight to the aggressive policies of imperialism. [applause]

We live in the real world and we construct our international policy taking into account the specific features of the present stage of international development. A creative analysis of this and our view of the future have brought us to the very considerable conclusion: Today it is more important than ever before to find ways for closer and more productive cooperation with governments, parties, and public organizations and movements which are really concerned about the fate of peace on earth and with all peoples in order to create a comprehensive system of international security. [applause]

The fundamental principles of such a system could be presented in the following way:

In the military sphere: A renunciation by the nuclear powers of either nuclear or conventional war against each other or against third states; the prevention of an arms race in space; the cessation of all nuclear weapons testing and the total elimination of these weapons; the banning and elimination of chemical weapons; renunciation of the creation [sozdaniye] of other means of mass extermination; a strictly verified [kontroliruyemoye] reduction in the level of the military potentials of states to a reasonable sufficiency; the disbanding of military groupings and, as a step toward this, the renunciation of any expansion of them and of forming any new ones; and a proportional, balanced reduction in military budgets.

In the political sphere: unconditional respect in international practice for the right of every people to choose the paths and forms of its development; the just political settlement of international crises and regional conflicts; the drawing up of a complex of measures aimed at building confidence between states; the creation of effective guarantees against attacks upon states from outside and the inviolability of their frontiers; and the drawing up of effective methods for preventing international terrorism, including security for the use of international land, air, and sea communications.

In the economic sphere: the exclusion from international practice of all forms of discrimination; the abrogation of the policy of economic blockades and sanctions where this is not provided for directly by recommendations of the world community; a joint search for ways toward a just settlement of debt problems; the establishment of a new world economic order guaranteeing the equal economic security of all states; the drawing up of principles for the use of part of the funds which will be released as a result of reductions in military budgets for the good of the world community and, first and foremost, of the developing countries; and the uniting of efforts in the research and peaceful utilization of space and the solution of the global problems on which the fate of civilization depends.

In the humanitarian sphere: cooperation in the dissemination of the ideas of peace, disarmament, and international security; the raising of the level of general objective knowledge about and of the mutual familiarity of peoples with each others' lives, the strengthening of a spirit of mutual understanding and harmony in relations between them; the eradication of genocide, apartheid, the propagation of fascism and of any other racial, national, or religious exclusiveness, as well as discrimination by people on this basis; the expansion, while respecting the laws of every country, of international cooperation in the implementation of the political, social, and personal rights of man; the solution in a humane and positive spirit of questions of the reunification of families, of marriages, and of the development of contacts between people and organizations; and the strengthening and the search for new forms of cooperation in the spheres of culture, art, science, education, and medicine.

These bases emerge logically from the provisions of the CPSU program. They conform totally with our specific foreign policy initiatives. Guided by them, it would be possible for peaceful coexistence to become the supreme and universal principle of interstate relations.

In our view these foundations could become a point of departure, a kind of framework, for a direct systematic dialogue of the leaders of the countries of the world community — both bilateral and multilateral. And if it is a matter of the fate of the world, such a dialogue is particularly important among the permanent members of the Security Council — the five nuclear powers. On them lies the main burden of responsibility for the fate of mankind. I stress — not privilege, not a basis for claims to leadership in world affairs, but responsibility about which no one has the right to forget. Why, then, can their leaders not gather around the table and discuss what is possible and necessary to do for strengthening peace? [applause]

In our view the whole mechanism which has come into being for negotiations on arms limitations must begin work to achieve a maximum return. Can one become accustomed to the fact that, as if on parallel course, such negotiations continue for years and at the same time, the buildup in arms is going on. The Soviet Union devotes much attention to joint examination at international forums, including within the framework of the Helsinki process, of problems and prospects for the international economy, mutual links, disarmament, development, expansion of trade, and scientific and technical cooperation. [PRAVDA renders the preceding sentence: "...international economy, mutual links between disarmament and development and expansion of trade..."] In the future, we would consider it an important matter to convene a worldwide congress on the problems of economic security, where everything that burdens the world's economic links could be discussed as a whole [v kompese]. We are also ready to seriously examine any other proposals which move in this direction. Success in the battle against war must be achieved without fail; success which will become an historic victory for the whole of mankind — of every man on earth. The CPSU sees the very essence of its foreign policy strategy as active participation in this battle. [applause] [Ligachev then takes the podium and announces a 30-minute recess]

[PRAVDA here inserts the section subhead: "V. The Party"]

The indomitable flow of history has already taken off for the turnover between the second and third millennia. What lies beyond this boundary? We shall not prophesy, but we know that the plans which we are putting forward today are not commonplace ones, but audacious ones, that our everyday affairs are imbued with the spirit of socialist morality and justice. [applause]

In today's troubled age, our social and, I would say, life strategy is aimed at people preserving the planet [PRAVDA here adds "the skies"]; and outer space, conquering it like settlers of a peaceful civilization, having cleared life of nuclear nightmares and finally liberated for constructive aims, and constructive ones only, all the best qualities of such a unique inhabitant of the universe as man. [applause]

The Soviet people can rest assured that the party is profoundly aware of its responsibility for the country's future and for a stable peace on earth, for the correctness of the course mapped out. The main thing that is needed for its practical implementation is persistent work, unity of the party and the people, and cohesive action by all working people. [applause] Only like this, in this and only this way, will we be able to fulfill the behest of great Lenin: to rise higher and go forward with energy and unity of will. We were not given another destiny by history, but what a fine destiny it is, comrades. [applause]

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